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This Essay challenges a central narrative in the history of Anglo-
American business by questioning the importance of the corporate form.
The Essay shows that the corporate form was not, as we have long
believed, the exclusive historical source of powers such as limited
liability, entity shielding, tradable shares, and legal personhood in
litigation. These powers were also available throughout modern history
through a little-studied, but enormously important, device known as the
common law trust. The trust was widely and very effectively used to
hold the property of unincorporated partnerships and associations in
England and the United States both long before and long after the
passage of general incorporation statutes in the mid-nineteenth century.
The trusts success in wielding corporation-like powers suggests that the
corporations role in legal history was smaller than-or at least different
from-the one we have long assigned to it. This Essay thus lays the
groundwork for a new account of the corporate form and its place in the
development of modern business.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay challenges a central narrative in the history of Anglo-
American business by questioning the importance of the corporate form.
I argue that the corporate form was not, as we have often been told, the
exclusive historical source of the legal powers that enabled modern
business. I show that from the late Middle Ages to at least the middle of
the twentieth century, the basic powers of the corporate form were also
available through an underappreciated but enormously important legal
device known as the common law trust.
Throughout modern history, the common law trust frequently
allowed businesses to obtain many of the same doctrinal advantages as
then-existing versions of the corporate form, including limited liability,
entity shielding, capital lock-in, tradable shares, legal personhood in
litigation, and a sensible scheme of fiduciary powers. And the trust
offered these features in a format that was cheaper and easier to access
than the corporation. The trust was never a completely perfect substitute
for the corporate form, and it was occasionally burdened by legislative
acts that made the trust illegal or otherwise less appealing than the
corporate form. Nevertheless, as a matter of judicial doctrine, the trust
was remarkably effective in offering the key features of the corporate
form.
Because it was so effective as a substitute for the corporate form, the
trust was widely used in England and the United States to hold the
property of unincorporated partnerships and associations both long
before and long after the corporate form became freely available
through statutes of general incorporation in the mid-nineteenth century.
Indeed, at the time general incorporation statutes first appeared, many
large businesses actually preferred the trust. When the United Kingdom
passed its first general incorporation statute in 1844, for example, trusts
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outnumbered corporations in the United Kingdom by a ratio of more
than ten to one.1 And of the 882 large business trusts then in existence,
only four chose to incorporate after the general incorporation statute
made incorporation freely available.2 The rest of these companies all
preferred to remain as trusts. English case reports from judicial opinions
in the first half of the nineteenth century thus show trustees holding the
property of docks, theaters,4 spas and pleasure grounds,' fraternal
organizations,6 railroads,7 shippers,8 ferries,9 distilleries,10 land develop-
ers,7 mines,12 insurance companies,1 3 banks,14 and companies in other
industries."
The trust's role in history matters because it pushes us to reassess a
central narrative in the modern understanding of the development of
business law. Generations of scholars have devoted their attention to
studying the rise of the corporate form because they have believed that
the corporate form was the key development in the making of modern
1. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of trusts
among multiowner businesses).
2. See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (discussing the unpopularity of
the corporate form among existing businesses).
3. See Meux v. Maltby (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (Ch) 622; 2 Swanst. 277, 278.
4. See Const v. Harris (1824) 37 Eng. Rep. 1191 (Ch) 1191; Turn. & R. 496, 496.
5. See Schreiber v. Creed (1839) 59 Eng. Rep. 515 (Ch) 515; 10 Sim. 9, 9.
6. See Duke of Queensbury v. Cullen (1787) 1 Eng. Rep. 646 (HL) 649; 1 Bro. Parl.
Cas. 396, 401.
7. See Parker v. River Dunn Navigation Co. (1847) 63 Eng. Rep. 1028 (Ch) 1028; 1
De G. & Sm. 192, 192.
8. See id. at 1029; 1 De G. & Sm. At 192.
9. See Cross v.Jackson, 5 Hill 478, 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
10. See In re The Vale of Neath & S. Wales Brewery Joint Stock Co. (1849) 41 Eng.
Rep. 1250 (Ch) 1254; 1 Mac. & G. 225, 241; Spears v. Murray (1839) 7 Eng. Rep. 665 (HL)
665; 6 Cl. & F 180, 180 (appeal taken from Scot.).
11. See Van Vechten v. Terry, 2 Johns. Ch. 197, 197 (N.Y. Ch. 1816); In re Dickson
(1836) 14 S 958, 958 (Scot.).
12. See Vigers v. Pike (1842) 8 Eng. Rep. 220 (HL) 220; 8 Cl. & F 562, 562 (appeal
taken from Ir.).
13. See Fenn v. Craig (1838) 160 Eng. Rep. 680 (Ex. Ct.) 680; 3 Y & C. Ex. 216, 216;
Long v. Yonge (1830) 57 Eng. Rep. 827 (Ch) 827; 2 Sim. 369, 369; Munnings v. Bury
(1829) 48 Eng. Rep. 59 (Ch) 60; Taml. 147, 148; Beaumont v. Meredith (1814) 35 Eng.
Rep. 447 (Ch) 447; 3 Ves. & B. 180, 180; Mildmay v. Folgham (1797) 30 Eng. Rep. 1111
(Ch) 1111; 3 Ves.Jr. 471, 471; Buchanan v. Lennox (1838) 16 S 824, 824 (Scot.).
14. See Lund v. Blanshard (1844) 67 Eng. Rep. 540 (Ch) 541; 4 Hare 9, 9-10; Holmes
v. Henry (1836) 7 Eng. Rep. 38 (Ch) 38; 4 Cl. & F 99, 99-100; Taylor v. Hughes & Hodge
(1844) 7 I. Eq. R. 529 (Ch) 530.
15. See Benson v. Hadfield (1842) 49 Eng. Rep. 690 (Ch) 690; 5 Beav. 546, 547
(regarding the organization of a steamship company); Gillett v. Abbott (1838) 112 Eng.




business law.6 They have understood the corporation to be the exclusive
historical source of important legal technologies such as, limited liability
and legal personhood, and they have thus seen the invention and spread
of the corporate form as an essential step in the political and
technological progress that brought us to the present.17 This narrative
runs so deep in modern thinking that it provides the basic structure of
introductory classes on corporate law in American law schools. A class on
corporate law typically begins with a discussion of the common law
general partnership and then moves on to show how the corporation
introduced a set of doctrinal innovations, such as limited liability and
tradable shares, that solved each of the partnership's many problems.18
The history of the trust suggests that we need a new account of the
corporate form. By showing that the corporation was not, in fact, the
exclusive source of the legal technologies we have long associated with it,
the history of the trust casts doubt on the corporate form's importance-
or at least forces us to ask whether the corporate form might have been
important for a different set of reasons than the ones we have long
supposed. If the corporate form's main innovation was not to invent a
new set of legal technologies, then we must find the significance of the
corporate form in some other innovation or contribution. This Essay
does not take on the massive task of saying just what exactly the
corporate form's historical importance actually was. I save this task for
another day. But this Essay nevertheless offers something almost as
16. Two of the most prominent recent works in this vein are: Ron Harris,
Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-1844, at
167 (2000) [hereinafter Harris, Industrializing English Law], which traces the expansion
of access to the corporate form in England and argues that English industrial enterprises
had no satisfying alternative to the corporate form; and Margaret M. Blair, Locking in
Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century,
51 UCLA L. Rev. 387, 419 (2003) [hereinafter Blair, Locking in Capital], which argues that
the corporate form was the exclusive source of a feature Blair calls "capital lock-in." Other
works in this vein are too numerous to list exhaustively, but examples include Scott R.
Bowman, The Modern Corporation and American Political Thought: Law, Power, and
Ideology 1-5 (1996); Edwin Merrick Dodd, American Business Corporations Until 1860, at
1 (1954); John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a
Revolutionary Idea 56-60 (2003); Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business
Corporation, 1784-1855, at 182 (1982). The idea that the corporation is equivalent to its
technical features runs deep in the theoretical understanding of corporate law. See, e.g.,
John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law 1, 5
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (describing the core features of the corporate
form).
17. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business 287-312 (1977) (describing "the coming of the modern industrial
corporation" as being equivalent to the rise of big business).
18. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Guhan Subramanian,
Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization 33, 115, 607 (4th ed. 2012);
William A. Klein et al., Business Organization and Finance 51, 240-41 (11th ed. 2010); D.
Gordon Smith & Cynthia A. Williams, Business Organizations 29,115,190 (3d ed. 2012).
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important: It does the difficult historiographical work of showing why a
new account of the corporate form is necessary.
Despite its great importance, the trust's use in business has received
relatively little attention from modern legal scholars and historians.1 9
None of the leading modern casebooks on business organizations has
anything to say about the business trust.2 And we know far less about the
law of business trusts than we do about the laws of partnerships and
corporations.21 Although recent historians have done important work on
the history of the business trust in England before the appearance of
general incorporation statutes in 1844, this work tends to focus only on
England, rather than on the United States. Historical work on the history
of the trust also tends to stop upon the appearance of general
incorporation statutes, apparently on the assumption that this
development made the trust irrelevant. Further, this recent scholarship
follows the conventional wisdom about the history of business
organizations, telling us primarily that the trust was a fragile, inferior
alternative to the corporate form22 and that it created all the same
problems as the common law general partnership.2 Although some
19. The trust's use in donative transfers, by contrast, has attracted enormous
historical interest. The donative trust is a central component, for example, of Professor
John Langbein's history of equity in his textbook on the history of the common law. See
John H. Langbein et al., History of the Common Law 267-334 (2009) [hereinafter
Langbein et al., History of the Common Law].
20. See Allen et al., supra note 18; Klein et al., supra note 18; Smith & Williams,
supra note 18.
21. Only recently have legal scholars begun to take the business trust seriously in
modern law. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an
Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L.J. 165, 166 (1997) (discussing the large amount of
funds in the United States placed in trusts as part of business deals); Robert H. Sitkoff,
Trust as "Uncorporation": A Research Agenda, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 31, 35 (outlining a
research agenda for the statutory trust).
22. This is the thesis of Professor Ron Harris's influential book on the history of
English business organization. Harris, Industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 167
(" [T]he unincorporated company... could not offer most of the features inherent in the
joint-stock business corporation .... "). Historians in the early twentieth century were
more enthusiastic about the trust's accomplishments. Legal historian Frederic Maitland
famously declared in 1902 that by using trusts, "[iln truth and in deed we made
corporations without troubling king or parliament though perhaps we said we were doing
nothing of the kind." Frederic William Maitland, The Unincorporated Body, in 3 The
Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland 271, 283 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911).
Maitland did not supply details, however, and he had no access to the modern economic
theory that would have told him which details to study. Some recent historians have
described the trust's powers in cautiously optimistic terms, though not as optimistically as I
do here. See, e.g., Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, The Transatlantic Origins of the Business
Trust, 36 J. Legal Hist. 192, 209-10 (2015) (noting that "[a]lthough the Classical
,scientific' system of legal categorization posited the will of the state and that of individuals
in opposition, in practice they could work in tandem").
23. See Armand Budington DuBois, The English Business Company After the Bubble
Act, 1720-1800, at 217 (1938) (noting that a trust-based company was a "step-child of the
law," leaving "serious [legal] difficulties to surmount"); Gary M. Anderson & Robert D.
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recent scholarship has shown that the trust was widespread in eighteenth-
and early nineteenth-century England,2 4 even this recent scholarship
does not call into question the basic premise that the trust was legally
inferior.
By rediscovering the trust's effectiveness as a substitute for the
corporate form, this Essay makes common cause with a larger movement
in legal history that is revising the role of the corporate form and
emphasizing the value of its alternatives.25 This Essay goes beyond the
Tollison, The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the State, 3 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.
107, 110 (1983) ("Technically, [trusts] were subject to partnership law, meaning that every
member must join in the conveyance of shares and in ... legal actions, and that the death
of a member necessitated a reorganization of the enterprise (therefore granting minority
interests in the firm a dominant strategic position)."); Margaret M. Blair, The Four
Functions of Corporate Personhood, in Handbook of Economic Organization 440, 441
(Anna Grandori ed., 2012) [hereinafter Blair, Four Functions] ("The four functions that
legal entity status serves would be very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish using only
transactional contracts."); Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 16, at 419 ("[T]hese
'proto-corporations' were regarded by courts as a species of partnership."); Joshua Getzler,
The Duty of Care, in Breach of Trust 41, 73 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds., 2002)
("Modern historians have doubted Maitland's brilliant surmise of the utility of the trust for
trading enterprise; in fact businessmen from the late eighteenth century needed the
corporate form and separate legal personality in order to organize modern industrial
enterprise, and they sought and won free incorporation from the state."); Timothy
Guinnane et al., Putting the Corporation in Its Place, 8 Enterprise & Soc'y 687, 714 (2007)
("For all practical purposes, therefore, business people in the United States had only two
choices: they could organize as partnerships or they could take out corporate charters.");
Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Contractual
Flexibility: A Comparison of Business's Organizational Choices in France and the United
States During the Era of Industrialization, 7 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 28, 43 n.8 (2005)
(discussing limited American usage of trusts in the early nineteenth century due to
"drawbacks that made them less attractive" than other means of "concentrating
management"); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession: An Essay on the History of
Corporate Law, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 873, 888 (2000) ("By the time of the Bubble Act's repeal in
1825, judges, having had nothing to do with unincorporated joint-stock companies for a
century, were determined to fit them into an existing legal category (e.g., partnership)
rather than see them as a different form of contract altogether."); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
et al., The Emergence of the Corporate Form 1 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 2013-02, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2223905 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) ("In fact, the creation of legal personality for private businesses
required an active role for the legislator. As a bundle of proprietary right opposable to
third parties, it could not have been entirely achieved through private contracting.").
24. See Mark Freeman et al., Shareholder Democracies? Corporate Governance in
Britain and Ireland Before 1850, at 23 (2012) (describing the results of a survey of
historical business organizational documents). See generally James Taylor, Creating
Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in British Politics and Culture 1800-1870 (2006)
(tracing the influence ofjoint-stock companies in early industrial England).
25. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 4 (2010); Ryan Bubb,
Choosing the Partnership: English Business Organization Law During the Industrial
Revolution, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 337, 339 (2015); Guinnane et al., supra note 23, at 691-
96; Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1336
(2006) [hereinafter Hansmann et al., Rise of the Firm]. The paper that comes closest o
making the argument made here is Joshua Getzler & Michael Macnair, The Firm as an
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work in this new movement, however, by demonstrating for the first time
the technical effectiveness of the common law trust. To date, even those
who question the importance of the corporate form have tended either
to ignore the trust or to argue merely that for various reasons business
people were willing to tolerate the trust's many weaknesses.26 No
historian has yet shown that in fact the trust was almost as strong as the
corporation as a matter ofjudicial doctrine.
Parts I and II of this Essay begin by showing how the trust worked in
business and by demonstrating that the trust remained persistently
popular in business even after the passage of general incorporation
statutes. Part III then forms the heart of the Essay. It turns to previously
unexamined primary legal sources such as case reports and legal treatises
to show that for much of modern history, the trust offered each of the
key legal features that we now associate with the modern corporate form,
including entity shielding and capital lock-in, limited liability, legal
personhood in litigation, and a sensible scheme of fiduciary powers.
I. THE BASICS OF BUSINESS TRUSTS
Before examining the details of trust law doctrine, it is first useful to
understand how the trust initially emerged and how it worked in the
organization of a business.
A. Medieval Origins
Before the trust appeared in large, corporation-like business
companies, it had a long and varied career as a device for conveying real
property. In the earliest kind of trust-which was originally called a
"use"27 -a landowner would execute a conveyance known as a
"feoffinent" that transferred ownership of his land to a friend or
gentleman, whom we would now call a "trustee.' 28 The trustee would
then hold the property on the original owner's behalf, with the
understanding that at some future date, the trustee would convey the
property back to the original owner or his wife, children, or others as the
Entity Before the Companies Acts, in Adventures of the Law: Proceedings of the Sixteenth
British Legal History Conference, Dublin, 2003, at 267, 269-70 (Paul Brand et al. eds.,
2005) (arguing business firms were able to achieve entity-like status in many ways before
the companies acts of the mid-nineteenth century).
26. See, e.g., Bubb, supra note 25, at 348-50 (arguing that various historical
circumstances encouraged businesspeople to tolerate the trust's purported weaknesses).
See generally Ribstein, supra note 25 (surveying the history of business forms with little
discussion of the trust).
27. For simplicity, I generally avoid archaic terms in favor of their modern
counterparts. For a description of the subtle differences between a "use" and a "trust," see
N.G. Jones, Uses and "Automatic" Resulting Trusts of Freehold, 72 Cambridge L.J. 91,
103-12 (2013).
28. For a general discussion of early trusts, see Langbein et al., History of the
Common Law, supra note 19, at 299-311.
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original owner instructed.2 9 In these arrangements, the original owner
was analogous to what trust law would now call a "settlor."' 0 The people
for whose benefit the trustee held the property, such as the landowner's
wife or children, were analogous to "beneficiaries." At first these
arrangements were mere gentlemen's agreements and were unen-
forceable in the courts?1 They nevertheless grew in popularity in the
early 1300s and spread rapidly toward the late 1300s and early 1400s.
3 2
The basic principle behind the trust's popularity was that by giving
property to a trustee, a landowner could avoid a set of obligations that
applied to himself. The most famous example is the set of death taxes
and military obligations that modern historians call the "feudal inci-
dents." The feudal incidents essentially taxed the land a man owned
when he died, and they provided the primary source of revenue for the
English crown during the later stages of feudalism.3 3 The trust helped a
landowner avoid the feudal incidents by allowing him to manipulate the
way the law applied. Since the tax only applied to land that a man owned
in his own name at death, the tax did not apply if the land legally
belonged to a trustee, rather than to the deceased.34 The trust thus
became a fixture of late-medieval England.
B. Legal Protection of Trust Property
Giving land to a trustee was not without risks, however. Titling
property in the name of a trustee raised the prospect that the trustee and
his creditors might take the property for themselves. Once the trustee
became the legal owner of the property, the law courts bestowed on the
trustee all the rights and responsibilities of ownership, including the
right to use the property for himself and pledge the property to his
creditors.35
Landowners whose trustees proved unfaithful thus demanded help
from legal authorities outside of the law courts.3 16 Church courts began
29. Id.
30. When the Chancery first began enforcing trusts, a settlor was often known as a
"cestui que use" or a "feoffor to uses," and a trustee was often known as a "feoffee to uses."
See, e.g., Brent's Case (1687) 74 Eng. Rep. 319 (CP) 323; 2 Leon. 15, 19. Later on, the
term "cestui que use" would come to refer to beneficiaries. See EW. Maitland, The Origin
of Uses, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 127, 131 (1894).
31. See R.H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1503,
1503 (1979) (noting the common law courts refused to enforce uses).
32. J.M.W. Bean, The Decline of English Feudalism, 1215-1540, at 126 (1968)
(documenting the spread of uses in late-medieval England).
33. See id. at 5-20.
34. For descriptions of the trust as a device for avoiding the feudal incidents, see id.
at 136; Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Uses and Trusts 72-73 (London, E. & R. Nutt & R.
Gosling 1734); Maitland, supra note 22, at 274.
35. 4 William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 414-15 (1996).
36. For example, the Commons prayed in 1402 that a remedy might be provided
against "disloyal feoffees" who transferred the land they held in trust. Id. at 417.
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holding faithless trustees to account around the last quarter of the
1300s,3 7 and the Court of Chancery began doing so in the 1390s.8 With
the Chancellor's enforcement, the arrangements between landowners
and their trustees ceased to be mere contracts and became instead the
formalized, property-like arrangements that we now know as trusts.
3 9
The Chancellor's innovations consisted of three key doctrines that
helped to control misconduct by trustees. The first was a remedy: Rather
than simply suing a trustee for money damages, beneficiaries in
Chancery could sue for specific enforcement and recover the actual trust
property as compensation.40 Crucially, this remedy reached not just a
trustee who had actually breached his obligation to a settlor but also
certain people to whom the trustee had conveyed the property.41 Second,
the Chancellor offered new procedures for discovery. Unlike common
law courts, the Chancery allowed an aggrieved beneficiary to obtain
sworn responses from a trustee, to require the trustee to answer
questions under oath, and to compel the trustee to produce the trust
instrument and related documents.42 Finally, the Chancellor offered to
protect trust assets not only from a trustee but also from the trustee's
creditors. If a trustee went bankrupt, his creditors could seize the
property he owned personally for his own benefit but not the property he
held as trustee in trust for others.43 The creditors could take the trustee's
personal farm, for instance, but not the farm he held in trust for the
37. Helmholz, supra note 31, at 1504 (surveying records from church courts in
Rochester and Canterbury and finding that the church "regularly enforced feoffments to
uses").
38. The beginnings of the Chancery's enforcement of uses have been well
chronicled. See James Barr Ames, Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal
Essays 233-42 (1913); Bean, supra note 32, at 123-30; 4 Holdsworth, supra note 35, at
417-21; Langbein et al., History of the Common Law, supra note 19, at 305; A.W.B.
Simpson, A History of the Land Law 175-76 (2d ed. 1986); R.W. Turner, The Equity of
Redemption: Its Nature, History and Connection with Equitable Estates Generally 43-46
(1931).
39. It is possible that the first recorded example of the Chancery enforcing a trust
took place in 1446 in Myrfyn v. Fallan (1446) 2 Cal. P. Ch. xxi (Eng. & Wales). See Ames,
supra note 38, at 237 n.3.
40. Getzler & Macnair, supra note 25, at 272-74 (exploring the historical origins and
application of this remedy).
41. A beneficiary could take property from anyone who knew that the transfer
violated the terms of the trust or who received the trust property without giving equivalent
value in exchange. See 4 Holdsworth, supra note 35, at 432; 1 Austin Wakeman Scott, The
Law of Trusts § 1.4 (1st ed. 1939) [hereinafter Scott, Law of Trusts] (describing the
exemption for bona fide purchasers); 1 Selden Soc'y, Cases Concerning Equity and the
Courts of Equity 1550-1660, at 269 (W.H. Bryson ed., 2001) (exempting bona fide
purchasers from a beneficiary's claims for breach of trust and referring to a similar result
in ajudgment roll from the reign of King Henry VI).
42. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
Yale L.J. 522, 540 (2012) (describing the procedural innovations of the Chancery).
43. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 NYU. L. Rev. 434, 454-56 (1998).
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beneficiaries. As Professors Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei have
shown, this was an extraordinary innovation because it limited the rights
of a trustee's creditors even if the creditors had not personally agreed to
the limitations.44 This rule emerged gradually over time, but its essential
contours were in place by the mid-1400s.
45
Together, these innovations enabled a trustee to play the same basic
role as a corporation. Both a corporation and a trust offered a company
the ability to securely transfer ownership of its property to a distinct legal
person with a legal personality separate from any of the company's
individual shareholders. In a corporation, this distinct legal person was
an artificial entity created by legislation or royal charter. In a trust, this
distinct legal person was a natural human being who received the special
status of a trustee from judicial doctrine.
To be clear, a common law trust was never a distinct juridical
personality. Under the common law, a trust has always been a personal
obligation of the trustee. The courts of common law (as distinct from the
courts of equity) recognized the trustee as the legal owner of the trust
property and treated the trustee as though he were the one who incurred
all of the legal obligations associated with the trust.46 Nevertheless, the
trustee owed an obligation under the Chancery's principles of equity to
manage the property for the beneficiary's benefit.
47
44. See id.
45. At first, the rule probably operated indirectly. Today, an unsecured creditor can
seize any property-real or personal-of a debtor as long as the property is not already
committed to a security interest. Cf. Edward M. lacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic
and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 Va. L. Rev. 515 (2007) (noting the legal implications of
how a firm is structured and arguing that a creditor of an entity has a formal right to any
of that entity's property). In late medieval and early modern times, however, a creditor
generally could not take land (as distinct from personal property) unless the owner had
specifically given the creditor a security interest in it. See Claire Priest, Creating an
American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 Harv. L. Rev.
385, 401-07 (2006) (describing limits on the alienability of land in late-medieval English
law). Thus, there was no need for a rule in early trust law that protected real property from
a trustee's unsecured creditors. Since no one could take real property from a trustee
unless the trustee specifically pledged it, there was no point in cutting off the claims of
creditors who had no pledge. It was enough simply to have a rule that protected property
from the secured creditors who had received the pledges. This rule was already implicit in
the remedies against a trustee's transferees and pledgees that the Chancery began
enforcing in the mid-1400s. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing the
use of specific performance and property recovery as remedies). In any case, Lord
Chancellor Nottingham began fully protecting all forms of trust property from a trustee's
unsecured creditors in the late seventeenth century. See, e.g., Bennet v. Davis (1725) 24
Eng. Rep. 746 (Ch) 746-47; 2 P. Wins. 316, 316-19; Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea (1715) 24
Eng. Rep. 387 (Ch) 387-90; 1 P. Wins. 277, 277-83; Burgh v. Francis (1673) 36 Eng. Rep.
971 (Ch) 971; 3 Swanst. 550, 550; Turner, supra note 38, at 46-48.
46. Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 567-69
(Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 5th ed. 1995) (discussing the duties of a trustee).
47. Id. at 563 (introducing the different interests of trustees and beneficiaries in trust
property).
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C. Mechanics
This division between equitable and legal title was most famously
employed for planning estates and making family gifts. Less well known is
that the trust was also widely used to organize business companies. To see
how the mechanics of a business trust worked, consider the structure of a
real-life water supply company that appeared at the dawn of large-scale,
investor-owned business trusts in England in the late 1600s. I will return
to this company many times below. The details come to us through
judicial reports from the Chancery and House of Lords in the case of
Richmond v. City of London.48 To my knowledge, recent historians have
never analyzed this case, presumably because previous historical work on
the history of business organizations has focused on books, newspapers,
and contractual documents rather than on specifically legal sources such
as case law and legal treatises. The historiographical value of City of
London is nevertheless enormous because it appears to be the first
reported case ever to have involved a business company organized as a
trust, and the judges who resolved the case were forced to address a
number of key issues about the basic features of the company.
The reports of the case tell us about a company that came into being
when the City of London agreed to lease a supply of water to an
entrepreneur named Thomas Houghton.49 Houghton and the city
expected the water to come through a five-inch leaden pipe between a
natural spring outside the city and a conduit at Cheapside and Stock's-
market)0' At the time of the lease, the pipe was still under construction by
a contractor the city had hired.51 Under the lease, Houghton received
the right to use the water that was expected to flow through this pipe.
52
Houghton then planned to resell the water at a profit to private homes
and businesses3.5 In exchange, Houghton agreed to pay the city a large
one-time sum and then to make annual rent payments thereafter.
54
Houghton also agreed to invest £6,000 in infrastructure improvements
and to supply water for free to prisons and other public buildings in the
city.5
On the same day Houghton signed the lease with the city, he formed
a company to operate the lease by creating a trust.56 Houghton named
48. Richmond v. City of London (City of London 11) (1702) 1 Eng. Rep. 727 (HL); 1
Bro. Parl. Cas. 516; City of London v. Richmond (City ofLondon 1) (1701) 23 Eng. Rep. 870
(Ch); 2 Vern. 421.
49. City of London I11 Eng. Rep. at 727; 1 Bro. Par. Cas. at 516.
50. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Par. Cas. at 516.
51. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Par. Cas. at 516.
52. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Par. Cas. at 516.
53. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Par. Cas. at 516.
54. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Par. Cas. at 516.
55. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Par. Cas. at 516.
56. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Par. Cas. at 516.
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four trustees and assigned them the lease and all future profits that
might come out of it. 57 The assignment required the trustees to divide
the profits into 900 shares of equity and to sell these shares to the public
for £10 per share8.5 Houghton himself bought some of the shares, as did
some of the trustees, and members of the general public bought the
rest.59 The people who bought the shares were technically beneficiaries
of the trust, but as a practical matter, they resembled stockholders of a
modern corporation, with the trustees holding the property of the firm
much as a corporation might hold the property of a firm. 6 The reports
of the judges' opinions do not say exactly how many members of the
public ultimately purchased these 900 shares, but the reports do say that
the shareholders were numerous-so numerous, in fact, that bringing all




Houghton was the moving force behind the enterprise, and he
planned to use the proceeds of the stock offering to reimburse himself
for the cost of purchasing the lease and then to make the improvements
that the lease required.6 Unfortunately, the enterprise was a failure.
When the city's contractor finally finished work on the pipe, the pipe
turned out to be defective, carrying only six tons of water per hour,
instead of the nineteen tons the city had originally promised.
64
Houghton and the trustees refused to make the annual payments
required by the lease, and the city sued.65 The litigation that followed is a
rich source of information about what the trust accomplished in
structuring the company's legal affairs.
II. A THUMBNAIL HISTORY OF THE TRUST'S USE IN BUSINESS
Before we can understand what exactly the water company case and
others like it teach us, it will be useful to walk through the chronology of
the trust's appearance in business over time. The broad arc is one of
gradually growing popularity for the trust in England from the late
seventeenth century through the early eighteenth century, followed by
rapid growth in the early nineteenth century. The trust then moved over
to the United States, where it remained popular up through at least the
mid-twentieth century, long after general incorporation statutes
57. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. at 516.
58. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. at 516.
59. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. at 516.
60. See Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. at 516.
61. Id. at 728; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. at 518.
62. City of London 1 (1701) 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (Ch) 871; 2 Vern. 421, 423.
63. City of London H, 1 Eng. Rep. at 727; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. at 516.
64. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. at 516.
65. Id. at 727; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. at 517.
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broadened access to the corporate form in the mid-nineteenth century.66
That the trust was popular before the rise of general incorporation stat-
utes in the nineteenth century has been well known.67 That it remained
popular afterward is more surprising.
A. The Rise of the Business Trust in Eighteenth-Century England
The first entities to be used in big businesses were corporations.
They first appeared in the organization of for-profit business enterprises
in the mid-1500s, a few centuries after they began to be used in the
organization of charities. At first, the right to form a corporation
belonged mostly to the English crown. Queen Elizabeth, King James I,
and King Charles I all granted corporate charters to a variety of overseas
trading businesses and domestic businesses that aimed to earn a profit.
68
These early charters granted not just incorporation but also the right to
monopolize certain areas of trade.69 The sale of these monopoly rights
naturally upset the would-be competitors of the chartered businesses,
and after Parliament expelled James II in the Glorious Revolution of
1688, Parliament itself became the primary source of incorporation for
English businesses.
70
Until 1844, Parliament had a rather cumbersome method for
incorporating a business: It passed a special act of incorporation for each
company it formed. The privileges of incorporation were given out one
by one to a single business at a time.y7 This process of special acts
required constant lawmaking, and because it provided so much
opportunity for opposition and political maneuvering, the process was
difficult, expensive, and (by modern standards) corrupt.
72
Soon after the Revolution of 1688, a boom in the English economy
brought the rapid proliferation of new companies.73 Around this time,
large businesses with many passive investors became common for the first
time. Also around this time, the trust first began to appear in these new
66. The trust also has a history in other common lawjurisdictions outside the United
States, such as Australia, Canada, and Scotland. I focus exclusively on England and the
United States simply for the sake of brevity.
67. See Freeman et al., supra note 24, at 53; Harris, Industrializing English Law,
supra note 16, at 22.
68. Harris, Industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 41; see also 2 William
Robert Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish, and Irish Joint-Stock
Companies to 1720, at 3 (1910) [hereinafter Scott, Constitution and Finance] (cataloging
trading expeditions to Africa).
69. Freeman et al., supra note 24, at 45-46.
70. Id.
71. Taylor, supra note 24, at 4.
72. Id. at 3-8.
73. Scott, Constitution and Finance, supra note 68, at 326.
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and large businesses.74 Companies with large numbers of passive
shareholders became known as 'joint-stock companies," with trust-based
companies becoming known as "unincorporated" companies and
corporation-based companies becoming known as "incorporated"
companies.7 5 Both trusts and corporations grew in popularity in the late
1600s and early 1700s, with perhaps a hundred unincorporated trust-
based companies operating in England and Wales by the late 1600s.76
The incorporated and unincorporated companies together
supported a flourishing market for the trading of shares, but in 1720
share prices collapsed.77 The major cause was the political machination
of a large financial enterprise known as the South Sea Company.
78
Originally chartered as an overseas trading company, the South Sea
Company moved into a complicated financial business of creating a
market for government-issued debt. Parliament and the South Sea
Company perceived in the new unincorporated companies a source of
competition for capital as well as a threat to the investing public, and so
they worked together to pass the so-called Bubble Act of 1720.71 This Act
outlawed unincorporated trust-based companies if they had tradable
shares and "presume [ed] to act as a Corporate Body."80
Modern historians have found that the Bubble Act was widely
ignored and that it did not stop trusts from becoming widespread in the
organization of English business in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.81 The Act was almost never enforced from the time of its
passage in 1720 up through the early nineteenth century.8 2 Indeed, one
historian argues that its principal effect was actually to make
unincorporated companies even more common than they otherwise
might have been because, after the Act, Parliament became less willing
74. See Freeman, et al., supra note 24, at 14 tbl.1.1 (showing trusts in existence as of
1720); Harris, Industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 53-58 (arguing company
formation began increasing rapidly after the Glorious Revolution of 1688).
75. For a history of the term "joint-stock company," see Paddy Ireland, Capitalism
Without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and the Emergence of the Modern
Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality, 17J. Legal Hist. 41 (1996).
76. Freeman et al., supra note 24, at 21.
77. Id. at 22 (explaining that the Bubble Act helped to diminish the market for
shares).
78. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, General Incorporation in Nineteenth Century
England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative Processes, 6 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.
169, 171-73 (1986); Ron Harris, The Bubble Act: Its Passage and Its Effects on Business
Organization, 54 J. Econ. Hist. 610, 610 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, The Bubble Act];
Margaret Patterson & David Reiffen, The Effect of the Bubble Act on the Market for Joint
Stock Shares, 50J. Econ. Hist. 163, 167-69 (1990).
79. Harris, The Bubble Act, supra note 78, at 610.
80. 6 Geo. 1 c. 18, § 18 (1720) (Eng.).
81. See DuBois, supra note 23, at 12-13 (noting that businesspeople and lawyers
generally came to ignore the Bubble Act when contemplating new business enterprises).
82. Taylor, supra note 24, at 5-6 (discussing changes in enforcement of the Act
during the nineteenth century).
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than it previously had been to grant acts of incorporation, leaving the
trust as the only real alternative.3 The best evidence of this is a new study
by Professors Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson, and James Taylor, which
identified approximately 1,400 joint-stock companies formed in England,
Ireland, and Scotland between 1720 and 1844.4 Professors Freeman,
Pearson, and Taylor coded the governance characteristics of 514 of these
companies and found that nearly half of the companies-224-were
unincorporated.s1 The great bulk of the companies were formed during
the early nineteenth century, but of the seventy-three companies formed
during the eighteenth century, seventeen were unincorporated.6 The
data show that unincorporated companies relied heavily on the trust. Of
the 224 unincorporated companies in the sample, nearly all-209-held
their property in the names of trustees.8 7 Other historians working with
less quantitative methods have reached similar conclusions.8 8 To be clear,
although the trust was widespread, many businesses that placed their
property in trust did not expressly call themselves "trusts." Instead, they
called themselves "partnerships," "associations," or simply "companies."' 9
B. Regulation and Expansion in the Nineteenth Century
The Bubble Act briefly returned to prominence in 1808-eighty-
eight years after the Act's passage-when the Court of King's Bench
threatened for the first time in nearly a hundred years to hold an
entrepreneur liable for forming a trust in breach of the Bubble Act.90
The business community reacted angrily, however, and Parliament
formally repealed the Bubble Act in 1825.91
Despite this legal uncertainty, business trusts continued to prolif-
erate. As noted above, English case reports from the first half of the
83. See DuBois, supra note 23.
84. See Freeman et al., supra note 24, at 23.
85. Id. at 15 tbl.L.1.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 54.
88. See DuBois, supra note 23, at 222 (arguing that unincorporated companies were
common in the eighteenth century and that "extremely rare was the 18th century
unincorporated organization that did not make at least some use of trustees").
89. Professor Paddy Ireland discusses the history of the term "company" and how it
was often used independently of organizational form. Ireland, supra note 75, at 42-45.
90. R v. Dodd (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 670 (KB) 670-72; 9 East 516, 518. For analysis,
see Alceste Santuari, The Joint Stock Company in Nineteenth Century England and
France: King v. Dodd and the Code de Commerce, 14J. Legal Hist. 39 passim (1993). Lord
Chancellor Eldon also suggested in a judicial opinion in 1825 that trust-based companies
might be illegal under the common law, independent of the Bubble Act. Kinder v. Taylor
(1825) 3 LJR 68 (Ch) 75 (Eng.); Ron Harris, Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal
Institutions, and the Repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825, 50 Econ. Hist. Rev. 675, 687-88
(1997) [hereinafter Harris, Political Economy].
91. Harris, Political Economy, supra note 90, at 688-91 (chronicling the development
of bills to repeal the Bubble Act).
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nineteenth century show trustees holding the property of companies in a
vast array of industries.92 In the mid-1820s and then again in the mid-
1830s, England witnessed two massive booms and busts of joint-stock-
company formation. The trust played a crucial role in each of these
cycles, and by 1845, the first comprehensive census of joint-stock com-
panies in England showed that trusts vastly outnumbered corporations
among multiowner businesses: Trusts prevailed by a ratio of more than
ten to one.94 Among the 966 business companies with more than
twenty-five shareholders then in existence in England, the Registrar of
Joint-Stock Companies could confidently identify only eighty-four as
corporations .The remaining 882-about ninety percent of the total-
were likely organized as trusts.
9 6
In the 1830s and 1840s, the booms in unincorporated trust-
based companies greatly alarmed Parliament. A special committee of
Parliament published a report showing that many of the new businesses
were fraudulent or dismally failing.97 In response, Parliament passed the
Registration Act of 1844.98 The Registration Act is widely celebrated as
England's first general incorporation statute because it permitted entre-
preneurs to circumvent the special legislation process in Parliament and
to form a corporation by registering with a newly appointed government
official known as the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies.9 9 Under the
92. See supra notes 3-15 and accompanying text (documenting the types of
industries in which trustees held property).
93. Freeman et al., supra note 24, at 18 fig.l.1; Taylor, supra note 24, at 106, 121,131.
94. Privy Council for Trade, Report by the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies to the
Committee of Privy Council for Trade, 1845, [C. (1st series)], at 694 (UK) [hereinafter
Report by the Registrar] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This report was the first
report published after the Registration Act of 1844 that required all companies with more
than twenty-five shareholders to register with the Registrar ofJoint-Stock Companies.
95. Id.
96. Id. For purposes of this analysis, I count as a corporation every business whose
"constitution" was listed as having been created by an "Act of Parliament," "Charter," or
both. I assume that everything reported as having been formed by "deed" or "deed of
settlement" was a trust. I further assume that if the form of organization was unstated, a
company was not organized as a corporation and that the company probably used a trust.
The assumption that every unincorporated company used a trust is consistent with
Professors Freeman, Pearson, and Taylor's data showing that nearly every unincorporated
company in the eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century used a trust.
See Freeman et al., supra note 24, at 53.
97. Select Committee on Joint Stock Companies, First Report, 1844, HC, at 119
(UK). The report's subsections had titles such as "The Modes of Deception Adopted," id.
at ix, "The Impunity of the Offenders," id. at xi, "The Amount and Distribution of
Plunder," id. at x, and "The Circumstances of the Victims," id. at xi.
98. Registration Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110 (UK).
99. See Harris, Industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 282-84 (discussing the
novelties of the Act and noting that "until 1844 [companies] could enjoy only some of the
privileges of full incorporation and of the corporate entity"); L.C.B. Gower, Some
Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1371
(1956) ("it was not until 1844, when a general act of Parliament provided for incor-
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Act, a registering company had to disclose the names of its directors and
subscribers and the contents of the deed of settlement that created the
company.00 The company also had to appoint an auditor0 and make
regular reports to the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies about its
operations and changes in shareholders.
1 0 2
Recent historians widely regard this Act as a boon for English
businesses,1 0 3 but contemporary observers did not necessarily see it that
way. It turned out to be very difficult to convince businesses to abandon
the trust and adopt the corporate form in its place. The crucial fact
about the Registration Act of 1844 was that unlike modern corporation
statutes, the Registration Act was mandatory, rather than permissive.
Under the Act, every new partnership, company, or association that was
carried on for profit and had tradable shares or more than twenty-five
members had to register as a corporation, regardless of whether the
proprietors wanted to organize the business as a corporation.
10 4
Rather than celebrating the availability of incorporation as a boon,
contemporary businesspeople avoided it. The best evidence of the
corporation's unpopularity comes from previously unexamined data on
the choices of then-existing businesses. Although the Registration Act of
1844 required incorporation for all new businesses, it offered existing




It turned out that of the 882 unincorporated joint-stock companies with
more than twenty-five stockholders in existence at the time the statute
first came into force, only four chose to incorporate.10 6 The remarkable
apathy with which existing businesses greeted the news of free
incorporation suggests that incorporation was not very valuable.
It is possible, of course, that the corporate form offered some
advantages and that the only reason businesses did not grab hold of these
advantages was because of the various inconveniences involved in
switching to the corporate form. Existing businesses might have been
poration by simple registration, that incorporation was made readily available in
England."). Professor James Taylor's recent account sees the 1844 Act in more
complicated terms, arguing that its purposes were as much regulatory as they were
empowering. Taylor, supra note 24, at 137-47.
100. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110 § 7.
101. Id.
102. Id. §§ 7,11,14.
103. See Harris, industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 282-85; Gower, supra
note 99, at 1371 (describing the "boons of corporate personality and limited liability").
104. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, §§ 2, 7.
105. Id. § 58. If they chose to incorporate, they had to register completely just as new
companies did. If they chose to remain as trusts, they only had to register in a limited way,
disclosing only their names, the nature of their businesses, and their principal addresses,
while keeping other information private, such as the names of their subscribers and the
contents of their deeds of settlement. Id. Companies that chose only the limited
registration would not become corporations. Id.
106. See Report by the Registrar, supra note 94.
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locked into the trust form by terms of their deeds of settlement or by the
five-pound fee10 7 and the regulatory obligations that the Registration Act
imposed on corporations, which demanded the hiring of auditors and
the disclosure of a company's directors, shareholders, and deed of
settlement.0 8 These inconveniences, however, effectively place an upper
bound on any estimate of what the benefits of incorporation might have
been. Though incorporation may have been useful, the benefits of
incorporation were apparently not enough to outweigh this fairly modest
set of costs.
Existing companies were not the only businesses to resist the
corporate form; some newly formed companies also successfully fought
in the courts to avoid it as well. The Companies Act of 1862, which
replaced the Registration Act of 1844, followed the pattern set by the
1844 Act by requiring incorporation for every "Company, Association, or
Partnership consisting of more than Twenty Persons."10 9 In a series of
opinions in the 1870s and 1880s, the Chancery and House of Lords
decided that in applying this twenty-person threshold, they would count
the number of a business's trustees rather than the number of its
shareholders.1 0 Hence, so long as a business had fewer than twenty
trustees, it did not have to incorporate, even if it had hundreds of
shareholders. This effectively destroyed the mandatory registration
requirement, since any business could easily avoid the requirement by
just appointing fewer than twenty trustees. Thus, the trust both survived
and thrived in England long after the rise of the corporate form. Up
through at least the middle of the 1880s, partnership-like arrange-
ments-which were probably often based on the trust-appear to have
been more common among large English businesses than was the
corporation and another newly created corporation-like entity, known as
a limited liability company.1
107. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, § 21.
108. Id. § 7.
109. Companies Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, § 4 (UK).
110. See Crowther v. Thorley (1884) 32 App. Cas. 330 (PC) 333 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (holding that the "business is, in law, the business of the trustees"); Smith v.
Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247, 279 (holding that the "trustees ... are nevertheless not
within the clause because they are fewer than twenty"); Sykes v. Beadon (1879) 11 Ch D
170,186 (noting it was the duty of trustees to register pursuant to the Companies Act).
111. See J.B. Jefferys, Trends in Business Organisation in Great Britain Since 1856:
With Special Reference to the Financial Structure of Companies, the Mechanism of
Investment, and the Relations Between the Shareholder and the Company 104-05 (June
1938) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting the existence of many more partnerships than corporation-like
entities in the 1870s and 1880s). To be clear, I am assuming that many of the
"partnerships" J.B. Jefferys refers to in fact held their property in the names of trustees,
since Professors Freeman, Pearson, and Taylor's data show that the great majority of large
partnerships used trustees through most of the nineteenth century. See Freeman et al.,
supra note 24, at 56.
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C. Enduring Popularity in America
The trust also remained popular after the rise of general
incorporation statutes in the United States. The trust came to the United
States by virtue of the United States' inheritance of English law. And the
trust remained popular in the United States even longer than it did in
England because of the peculiar features of American corporation law.
As in England, corporations in the United States could initially be
formed only by special legislative acts passed by state legislatures.1 12 But
also as in England, most American states had adopted statutes of general
incorporation by the mid-nineteenth century that made incorporation
available to anyone who filed the appropriate documents with a
government official.113
The trust remained popular in the United States up through the
1920s because the American general incorporation statutes offered even
more reason to prefer the trust than their English counterparts did.
Unlike the English general incorporation statutes, the American general
incorporation statutes did not require new companies to incorporate;
they merely permitted companies to do so.11 4 This left more space for
American companies to choose the trust instead of the corporation.
Additionally, the American laws offered much harsher treatment of
companies that chose to incorporate.1 1 5 American general incorporation
statutes bristled with mandatory rules that were absent in their English
counterparts. American laws contained detailed shareholder voting
requirements, maximum capitalization limits, par value requirements,
supermajority voting requirements for mergers, preemption rights for
stock issues, personal liability for directors, prohibitions on ownership of
land, restrictions on dividend payments, complicated appraisal remedies
in mergers, restrictions on ownership of shares in other corporations,
112. See Blair, Four Functions, supra note 23, at 447; Sheldon A. Jones et al., The
Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies, 13 Del. J. Corp. L.
421, 425-26 (1988) [hereinafter Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust]; Ron
Harris & Naomi Lamoreaux, Contractual Flexibility Within the Common Law: Organizing
Private Companies in Britain and the United States 13 (June 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Faculty/Lamoreaux/
Contractual-Flexibility-1O.pdf [http://perma.cc/2J8UJ9WS].
113. Between 1836 and 1852 more than half of the states then in the Union adopted a
general incorporation statute, with the rest following by 1903. See Susan Pace Hamill,
From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst's Study of
Corporations, 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 81 app. at 178 (1999).
114. The New York Constitution of 1846, for example, indicated that "[c]orporations
may be formed under general laws" but did not require businesses to incorporate. Seavoy,
supra note 16, at 183.
115. See Gower, supra note 99, at 1372 (noting American corporations had little
flexibility in their rights or modes of action); Harris & Lamoreaux, supra note 112, at 4-5
(noting American incorporation statutes were restrictive in that they limited the size of the




and so on.116 Businesses could not easily escape these restrictive rules by
incorporating in less restrictive states because many states used foreign
corporation statutes to impose heavy restrictions on out-of-state corpo-
rations.117 The Supreme Court mostly permitted these restrictions on
foreign corporations under the federal Constitution until the 1910s.18
The business trust was thus widespread in the United States as a
regulation-light alternative to the corporate form. The trust remained a
popular vehicle for avoiding corporate regulations up through at least
the 1920s-long after general incorporation statutes had made the
corporate form widely available. The most prominent examples of the
trust's enduring popularity, of course, were the huge monopoly trusts
that inspired the "anti-trust" movement of the 1880s, such as United
States Steel and Standard Oil. 9 But monopoly trusts were just the tip of
the iceberg, and trusts remained common in business long after the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 shut the monopolies down.1 20 Judicial
opinions show the trust in ordinary, nonmonopolistic companies in a
wide array of industries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, including cotton mills and print works,121 parcel delivery
companies,22 street car lines,1 2 patent pools,
1 24 hotels,125 ferries,1 26 golf
courses,12 7 many different types of manufacturers,12' building and loan
associations,1 29 foundries,130  real estate development companies,
131
116. For an overview, see generally Harwell Wells, The Modernization of Corporation
Law, 1920-1940, 11 U. Pa.J. Bus. L. 573 (2009).
117. See H.A. Haring, Corporations Doing Business in Other States 71-94 (1927)
(describing statutory restrictions on foreign corporations).
118. Gerard Carl Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American
Constitutional Law, in Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence 110-11 (1918) (noting that a
series of cases, beginning in 1910, placed "important qualifications" on a state's power to
exclude or expel foreign corporations).
119. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial
Organization, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 105, 160 (1989) (discussing late-nineteenth-century
monopoly cases against those trusts).
120. See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012)).
121. See Thorn v. De Breteuil, 71 N.E. 470, 471 (N.Y. 1904).
122. See People ex rel. Nat'l Express Co. v. Coleman, 31 N.E. 96, 96 (N.Y. 1892).
123. See Venner v. Chi. City Ry. Co., 101 N.E. 949, 950 (Ill. 1913).
124. See Mayo v. Moritz, 24 N.E. 1083, 1083 (Mass. 1890).
125. See Upham v. Plankinton, 140 N.W. 5, 6 (Wis. 1913).
126. See Whitman v. Porter, 107 Mass. 522, 523 (1871).
127. See Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 347 (1935).
128. See Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223, 231 (1919) (paper); Malley v. Bowditch, 259
F 809, 812 (1st Cir. 1919) (textiles); Anderson Steam Vulcanizer Co. v. Comm'r, 6 B.T.A.
737, 737 (1927) (vulcanized rubber); Ricker v. Am. Loan & Tr. Co., 5 N.E. 284, 285 (Mass.
1885) (railroad cars); Schenkl v. Dana, 118 Mass. 236, 236 (1875) (armaments); Simson v.
Klipstein, 102 A. 242, 242 (N.J. Ch. 1917) (chemicals); In re Pittsburgh Wagon Works'
Estate, 54 A. 316, 316 (Pa. 1903) (wagons and agricultural implements).
129. See State ex rel. Great Am. Home Sav. Inst. v. Lee, 233 S.W. 20, 22 (Mo. 1921).
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lumber and salt companies,13 2 railroads,13 3 railroad terminals,13 4 real
estate developers,13 5 hospitals,13 6 retailers,1 3 7 sewing machine royalty
companies,1 3 8 mines,1 3 9 cafeterias,1 40 theaters,14 banks, and insurance
companies.1 42 Trusts also appeared in oil production,'43 real estate
development,1 44 and mutual funds.145 By the 1920s, a list of large business
trusts included many publicly owned operating companies of massive
size.146 Trusts were also ubiquitous in the writings of early-twentieth-
century legal practitioners and scholars. The 1910s and 1920s saw a
miniature boom in writings about business trusts in law reviews,
1 47
130. See In re Froelich's Estate, 100 N.Y.S. 436, 437 (Sur. Ct. 1906).
131. See Spotswood v. Morris, 85 R 1094, 1095 (Idaho 1906).
132. See Tappan v. Bailey, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 529, 535 (1842); Loud v. Winchester, 17
N.W. 784, 784 (Mich. 1883).
133. See Wright v. Caney River Ry. Co., 66 S.E. 588, 589 (N.C. 1909).
134. See Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 254 U.S. 196,
199-200 (1920).
135. See Hart v. Seymour, 35 N.E. 246, 247 (Ill. 1893); Priestley v. Burrill, 120 N.E. 100,
104-05 (Mass. 1918); Howe v. Morse, 55 N.E. 213, 213 (Mass. 1899); Wehrman v.
McFarlan, 9 Ohio Dec. 400, 401 (1899).
136. See R.I. Hosp. Tr. Co. v. Copeland, 98A. 273, 276 (R.I. 1916).
137. See Connally v. Lyons, 18 SW. 799, 799-800 (Tex. 1891).
138. See Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mass. 419, 419-22 (1883).
139. See State Nat'l Bank v. Butler, 36 N.E. 1000, 1002 (Ill. 1894); Swan v. Davenport,
93 N.W. 65, 65 (Iowa 1903).
140. See Dutton v. Comm'r, 18 B.T.A. 1151,1152 (1930).
141. See Rochester Theatre Tr. Estate v. Comm'r, 16 B.T.A. 1275, 1275 (1929).
142. See Townsend v. Goewey, 19 Wend. 424, 424-27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
143. See Ira P. Hildebrand, The Massachusetts Trust, 1 Tex. L. Rev. 127, 128, 153, 156,
160, 161 (1923) [hereinafter Hildebrand, Massachusetts Trust i] (citing cases involving
trusts in the oil industry); cf. Ira P. Hildebrand, Liability of the Trustees, Property, and
Shareholders of a Massachusetts Trust, 2 Tex. L. Rev. 139, 176 (1924) (noting the
"business trust had [not] confined its operations to the oil business" but instead had
"invaded the field of most of our business").
144. See Bank of Topeka v. Eaton, 100 F 8, 8-9 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
145. Paul D. Cravath, Introduction to Leland Rex Robinson, Investment Trust
Organization and Management, at xv (rev. ed. 1929); Marshall H. Williams, Investment
Trusts in America 1-2 (1928).
146. Comment, Massachusetts Trusts, 37 Yale L.J. 1103, 1107 n.20 (1928) [hereinafter
Comment, Massachusetts Trusts].
147. See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron, The Massachusetts Trust as Distinguished from
Partnership, 12 Ill. L. Rev. 482 (1918); Robert C. Brown, Common Law Trusts as Business
Enterprises, 3 Ind. L.J. 595 (1928); William W. Cook, The Mysterious Massachusetts Trusts,
9 A.B.A.J. 726 (1923); Leland S. Duxbury, Business Trusts and Blue Sky Laws, 8 Minn. L.
Rev. 465 (1924); Hildebrand, Massachusetts Trust i, supra note 143; Ira P. Hildebrand,
Massachusetts Trust,-A Sequel, 4 Tex. L. Rev. 57 (1925); R.J. Powell, The Passing of the
Corporation in Business, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 401 (1918); H. Rottschaefer, Massachusetts Trust
Under Federal Tax Law, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 305 (1925); Austin W. Scott, The Progress of
the Law 1918-1919-Trusts, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 688 (1920); Austin W. Scott, The Trust as an
Instrument of Law Reform, 31 Yale L.J. 457 (1922); Robert S. Stevens, Limited Liability in
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practice manuals, and treatises.148
Although legal sources show that the trust was common after the
mid-nineteenth century, it is hard to find statistics to this effect. Unlike a
corporation, a trust could be formed privately, without any public
filings.149 A trust thus did not always show up in state records of business
organizations. The trust also flew under the radar of both state and
federal tax records. State and federal tax law often treated a trust as a
partnership or corporation, making it impossible to see trusts directly or
to know which partnerships were actually using trusts.1 0 Nevertheless,
the anecdotal evidence of legal disputes and writing by legal practitioners
shows that the trust remained a major force in American business up
through at least the end of the 1920s.
III. THE TRUST AND THE FEATURES OF THE CORPORATE FORM
There is no question, then, that the trust was an enormously
important form of organization throughout the Industrial Revolution
and into the early decades of the twentieth century on both sides of the
Atlantic. But the question remains: Why? The answer is simple: Every
aspect of the corporate form that legal theorists and historians have
identified as key to the corporate form's success also existed in the trust.
Though the trust did not achieve all of the corporation's attributes
perfectly, it came close enough that businesses often preferred the trust
to the corporation even when the costs of incorporating were small. This
Business Trusts, 7 Cornell L.Q. 116 (1922); H.L. Wilgus, Corporations and Express Trusts
as Business Organizations, 13 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (1914); H.ET., Recent Cases, Trusts-The
Business Trust as a Legal Entity, 9 Tex. L. Rev. 299 (1931); Comment, The Doctrine of
Merger as Applied to Commercial Trusts, 29 Yale L.J. 97 (1919); Comment, Massachusetts
Trusts, supra note 146; Comment, Massachusetts Trusts and the Income Tax, 28 Yale L.J.
690 (1919); Comment, The Nature of Massachusetts Business Trusts, 27 Yale L.J. 677
(1918); Note, Taxation of Business Trusts, 42 Yale L.J. 270 (1932); Jasper F Rommel, Tax
Liability of Business Trusts: Crocker v. Malley and Hecht v. Malley Distinguished, 7 Nat'l
Income Tax Mag. 14 (1929).
148. See, e.g., William C. Dunn, Trusts for Business Purposes (1922); Robert Gardner
McClung, Representative Massachusetts Trusts (1912); Wilber A. McCoy, Business Trust
Agreements and Declarations of Trust (1922); John H. Sears, Trust Estates as Business
Companies (2d ed. 1921); Guy A. Thompson, Business Trusts as Substitutes for Business
Corporations (1920) [hereinafter Thompson, Business Trusts]; Edward H. Warren,
Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation (1929); Sydney R. Wrightington, The Law of
Unincorporated Associations and Similar Relations (1916).
149. See 1 Francis Williams Sanders, An Essay on Uses and Trusts, and on the Nature
and Operation of Conveyances at Common Law, and of Those, Which Derive Their Effect
from the Statute of Uses 15-16 (London, W. Walker, 4th ed. 1824) (indicating that
conveyances in trust had been made in secret since late medieval times).
150. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 360 (1935) (holding that trusts
formed for business purposes should be taxed the same as corporations); Hecht v. Malley,
265 U.S. 144, 156-57, 161 (1924) (holding that some, but not all, trusts were to be taxed
like corporations); Hoadley v. Cry. Comm'rs, 105 Mass. 519, 526-27 (1870) (taxing shares
in a trust as though they were shares in a partnership).
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Part analyzes five elements that historians and modern theorists identify
as important to large, investor-owned business organization: entity
shielding and capital lock-in, limited liability, legal personhood in
litigation, tradable shares, and fiduciary powers and duties.
My focus here is on judicial doctrine and what it achieved. The trust,
of course, existed in a larger context of laws beyondjudicial doctrine that
included statutes and legislative acts. Sometimes these statutes-such as
the Bubble Act and the Registration Act of 1844 in England-intervened
to make the trust less appealing than it otherwise might have been.T
The trust's achievements in legal doctrine are nevertheless important
because they challenge the notion that the corporation was the exclusive
source of key doctrinal technologies. The enormous power of the trust in
judicial doctrine suggests that although the corporation may have had
certain advantages, these advantages did not lie in the technical doctrinal
features that scholars of corporation law have tended to focus upon.
A. Entity Shielding and Capital Lock-In
Let us first consider entity shielding and its close cousin, capital lock-
in. These are perhaps the most fundamental features of organizational
law. Indeed, to identify their appearance is to discover the rise of the
modern firm. 152 Entity shielding and capital lock-in, which were first
identified in an influential article in 2000 by Professors Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman, are important because they help businesses hold
their assets together.153 Entity shielding stops the owners and creditors of
a business from taking the assets of the business away before the assets
have had a chance to perform their intended purpose and produce an
investment return. Entity shielding does this by preventing the owners
from individually demanding that he business liquidate and sell off its
assets.154 Entity shielding also prevents the owners' creditors from doing
the same if the owners ever become bankrupt.155 Thus, if I own shares in
a grocery store that is organized as a modern corporation, entity
shielding will stop my credit-card lenders from carting away the bread,
meat, and freezer cases that belong to the grocery store if I am unable to
repay my credit-card debt. The creditors of the store can attach these
assets, but my creditors cannot. Entity shielding is thus the reverse of
limited liability. While limited liability protects the owners of a business
151. See supra notes 77-90, 97-106 and accompanying text (describing minor
obstacles posed by these statutes and efforts to avoid them).
152. See Hansmann et al., Rise of the Firm, supra note 25, at 1399-401 (describing the
historical development of entity shielding).
153. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 393-98 (2000) (identifying the phenomenon that later would
become known as "entity shielding"). The term "entity shielding" first appeared in a
subsequent article. See Hansmann et al., Rise of the Firm, supra note 25, at 1336.
154. Hansmann et al., Rise of the Firm, supra note 25, at 1338.
155. See id. at 1337.
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from liabilities that might flow up from the business, entity shielding
works in the opposite direction, protecting the business from the
liabilities of the creditors and owners that might flow down.
156
The strong form of entity shielding available in modern corpo-
rations offers two features: priority and liquidation protection.157 That is,
the creditors of a modern corporation enjoy both (a) priority of payment
over the owners and their creditors and (b) the right to prevent the
owners and their creditors from forcing the business to sell off its assets
to pay their debts. The concept known as "capital lock-in" is an
application of this principle of entity shielding. 1 8 Capital lock-in allows a
business to restrict its owners, as well as the owners' creditors, from
taking away the business's property.
Entity shielding is crucially important in two respects. First, no
business with a large number of owners could survive without it. One
cannot run a grocery store with a thousand owners if each of these
owners and their creditors can constantly come in and pull product off
the shelves. Second, the owners cannot solve the problem by contract
alone. Even if the owners agree among themselves to limit their
creditors' rights to liquidate the business, this agreement will not actually
bind the owners' creditors-it will bind only the owners.
The conventional wisdom about entity shielding, famously explained
by Professor Margaret Blair, is that until the last thirty years or so, the
only way to achieve it in a strong form was through the corporation.1
59
The common law of partnership is said to have offered only priority and
not liquidation protection.1 60 The creditors of individual partners could,
in theory, force the breakup of a partnership and take the partnership's
property for themselves. Professor Blair argues that strong entity
shielding and capital lock-in did not become freely available in England
or the United States until the rise of the corporate form in the mid-
nineteenth century.1 6 Blair's argument has become enormously influ-
ential.
In fact, however, the corporation was almost never the exclusive
source of strong-form entity shielding in Anglo-American law. The trust
has offered a form of entity shielding at least as strong as that offered by
the modern corporation for as long as large investor-owned businesses
have been common.
1. Origins. - An analog to entity shielding first appeared in the trust
in the late Middle Ages as a direct consequence of the division between
156. See id. at 1336.
157. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 153, at 410-11 (explaining the
difference between priority and liquidation protection).
158. See Blair, Locking in Capital, supra note 16, at 388-92.
159. See id. at 390.
160. See id. at 396.
161. See id. at 413.
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legal and equitable title that characterizes the trust. The basic idea
behind entity shielding in the trust was that a creditor had certain rights
against a borrower's property162 but these rights only extended to
property that legally belonged to the borrower. Thus, if legal title
belonged to the borrower's trustee, rather than to the borrower, then the
borrower's creditor had no rights against the property. By giving property
to a trustee, a borrower could effectively eliminate his creditor's claims to
the property. Indeed, it was unclear at first whether a borrower's creditor
could even take the borrower's equitable interest in the property, let
alone the legal interest that formally belonged to the trustee.
163
The main evidence of the trust's effectiveness in avoiding bene-
ficiaries' creditors appears in the long string of statutes that Parliament
passed in the late Middle Ages to try to limit the trust's effectiveness and
prevent it from destroying the credit system. In a series of statutes passed
in 1377,164 1487,165 1543,166 and 1571,167 Parliament created what we now
know as the law of fraudulent transfers by prohibiting a person from
giving his property to a friend or trustee in order to avoid his creditors.
The 1571 statute, for example, prohibited a transfer for the purpose of
avoiding creditors notwithstanding "[a]ny Pretence, Color, fayned
162. To be clear, creditors' rights against a borrower's land (as distinct from rights
against a borrower personally) were much more limited in the late Middle Ages than they
are now. See Priest, supra note 45, at 403.
163. R.W. Turner argued that until the end of the 1600s, English courts tended to treat
a beneficial interest in trust as a chose in action-i.e., as a right to sue someone-rather
than as a form of tenure in property. Turner, supra note 38, at 44-46. And crucially, unlike
a tenure in property, a chose in action was not transferable. Id. at 44. It was personal to the
person who held it. Id. at 43. This meant, by implication, that a beneficial interest in trust
was probably not transferable or seizable by others-including a borrower's creditors. Id.
at 43.
To be clear, there is some dispute about whether equitable interests in trust were
assignable prior to the Chancellorship of Lord Nottingham in the late seventeenth
century. See Warmstrey v. Tanfield (1628) 21 Eng. Rep. 498 (Ch) 498; 1 Rep. Ch. 29, 29
(" [H] owbeit a Grant of future Possibility is not good in Law, yet a Possibility of a Trust in
Equity might be assigned .. "). A substantial amount of case law suggests equitable
interests were not assignable. See, e.g., Anonymous (1576) 145 Eng. Rep. 172 (Ex & Ch)
173; Jenk. 244, 245 (prohibiting transfer of an interest in trust); Ogle v. Lady Shrewsbury
(1632) 118 Selden Society 636 (Ex Ct) 636 (2001) (same); Scott, Law of Trusts, supra note
41, § 132 n.5 (citing Earl of Worcester v. Finch (1600) 123 Eng. Rep. 600 (Ch); 2 And. 162
(prohibiting transfer of an interest in trust)). But some commentators have argued that
equitable interests were assignable, including St. German in 1523 and Francis Bacon. See,
e.g., Francis Bacon, The Reading upon the Statute of Uses of Francis Bacon 16 (London,
William Henry Rowe ed., W. Stratford 1804) (1642); Christopher St. German, Doctor and
Student 185 (London, Henry Lintot 15th ed. 1751) (1531).
164. 1 Rich. 2 c. 9 (1377); 50 Edw. 3 c. 6 (1376-1377); see also Scott, Law of Trusts,
supra note 41, § 1.3.
165. 3 Hen. 7 c. 4 (1487). For a discussion of this statute, see W.J. Jones, The
Elizabethan Court of Chancery 429 (1967).
166. 34 & 35 Hen. 8 c. 4 (1542-1543).
167. 13 Eliz. c. 5 (1571).
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consideration expressing of Use [i.e., trust] or any other Matter or Thyng
to the contrary .... "16
These statutes were only a partial solution, however. They allowed a
creditor to seize an interest only in a fraudulent trust, not in a legitimate
trust. Parliament hus provided a more complete solution in the Statute
of Frauds in 1677.169 Section 10 of the statute permitted a creditor to
legally execute against almost any beneficial interest in trust, regardless
of who created the trust or whether its creation was fraudulent.
17
Crucially, however, creditors relying on the statute could seize only a
beneficiary's equitable interest and not the legal interest that belonged to the
trustee.71 If a beneficiary had a life interest in property, for example,
then the creditor could seize only the life interest and could not
immediately seize or occupy the property as a legal owner in fee simple.
This string of statutes thus had the effect of weakening the system of
entity shielding that previously protected trust property in the law of
trusts. But even the resulting weakened system turned out to be
extremely strong-and was actually almost exactly analogous to the
entity-shielding regime that now exists in the modern corporation.
Although a trust had never been a legal entity, the doctrines of Chancery,
as modified by the various statutes, ensured that the assets that legally
belonged to a trustee were shielded from a beneficiary's creditors almost
as though they belonged to a distinct entity. Much as the creditors of a
modern corporate shareholder can seize a shareholder's shares but not
the property that legally belongs to the corporation, likewise a trust
beneficiary's creditors could seize the beneficiary's equitable interest but
not the property that legally belonged to the trustee.
The value and strength of the trust's asset-partitioning powers are
evident in the trust's early use in secured lending and the resolution of
insolvencies. In 1518, Christopher St. German observed that the trust
had become ubiquitous as a security device "for Surety of divers
Covenants in Indentures of Marriage and other Bargains."1 72 Records of
the Court of Chancery also show evidence of secured lending from the
early 1600s well into the eighteenth century.1 73 To arrange a secured
168. Id.
169. 29 Car. 2 c. 3 (1677).
170. Scott, Law of Trusts, supra note 41, § 147, at 730.
171. See Creed v. Colville (1683) 23 Eng. Rep. 395 (Ch) 395; 1 Vern. 172, 174
(holding that even a run-of-the-mill interest in an inheritance trust was reachable by
creditors); Maitland, supra note 22, at 377-78 (describing the characteristics of
"ownership in equity"); Turner, supra note 38, at 161 (explaining that ajudgment creditor
has an equitable interest in the debtor's estate under the Statute of Frauds but not a legal
interest). The statute's effect was classically summarized in Forth v. Duke of Norfolk
(1820) 56 Eng. Rep. 791 (Ch) 791-92; 4 Madd. 503, 504-05.
172. St. German, supra note 163, at 184-85.
173. See 1 Selden Soc'y, supra note 41, at 229 (describing the 1600 case Lady Burrough
v. Powell & Serjeant Williams); see also Chetwynd v. Fleetwood (1742) 1 Eng. Rep. 580 (HL)
581; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 300, 300; Tasburgh v. Echlin (1733) 1 Eng. Rep. 934 (HL) 938; 2 Bro.
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loan, a borrower transferred his property to a trustee and then instructed
the trustee to return the property only if the borrower repaid the loan to
the creditor in full. 174 If the borrower failed to pay the loan in full, the
trustee was instructed to convey the property to the creditor instead. This
arrangement gave a right of priority to the secured creditor analogous to
entity shielding: Once the borrower gave his property to the trustee and
named a lender as a contingent beneficiary, the borrower's other lenders
could no longer seize the property. If we compare the trust to a
corporation, it was as though the borrower had given his money to a
corporation and thus prevented the borrower's own personal creditors
from reaching the property.
The trust also used its entity-shielding properties to administer debts
in insolvency. Once a debtor became insolvent, the process of admin-
istering his estate posed complicated problems. Borrowers and lenders
used the trust to solve these problems through arrangements that came
to be known as "compositions.' 17' The details varied, but the basics
involved a promise by a set of creditors to give up some of their remedies
against a debtor in exchange for a promise by the debtor to give up some
of his assets to a trustee and name the creditors as beneficiaries.76 The
trustees would then manage or sell the assets for the benefit of the
creditors, with the debtor retaining a remainder interest in anything left
over. 1 77 The trustees generally distributed money on a pro rata basis to
each of the creditors according to the value of their claims. Borrowers
gained a discharge from their debts, setting them free from the prospect
of imprisonment.17 And lenders gained confident access to the debtor's
property and the right to an orderly and fair liquidation process.
1 79
These arrangements depended crucially on asset partitioning. The
orderly liquidation process that creditors found so valuable in these
compositions was possible only because the trust shielded a debtor's
Parl. Cas. 265, 265-66; Paget v. Bridgewater (1724) 1 Eng. Rep. 1190 (HL) 1190; 3 Bro.
Parl. Cas. 79, 79-80; Allibon v. A-G (1707) 1 Eng. Rep. 341 (HL) 341; Colles 393, 393-95;
Kingsland v. Barnewall (1706) 2 Eng. Rep. 105 (HL) 105; 4 Bro. Parl. Cas. 154, 154;
Vernon v. Jones (1691) 24 Eng. Rep. 17 (HL) 17; Fin. Pr. 32, 32; Seymour v. Fotherby
(1691) 24 Eng. Rep. 23 (Ch) 23; Fin. Pr. 44, 44.
174. For examples of this kind of arrangement, see Jones v. Prior (1674) 23 Eng. Rep.
96 (Ch) 96; Fin. 175, 175; Foley v. Lingen (1674) 23 Eng. Rep. 91 (Ch) 91-92; Fin. 166,
166-67; Vaughan v. Morgan (1674) 23 Eng. Rep. 75 (Ch) 75; Fin. 138, 138.
175. Julian Hoppitt, Risk and Failure in English Business: 1700-1800, at 29-30 (1987);
V. Markham Lester, Victorian Insolvency: Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt, and
Company Winding-Up in Nineteenth-Century England 78 (1995); see Israel Treiman,
Majority Control in Compositions: Its Historical Origins and Development, 24 Va. L. Rev.
507, 523 (1938) (describing seventeenth-century efforts to ensure that trustees were not
used to favor some creditors over others in compositions).
176. See Hoppitt, supra note 175, at 29-30.
177. Id.
178. Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the
Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3J. Legal Hist. 153, 163 (1982).
179. PeterJ. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America 4-5 (1999).
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property from any of the debtor's creditors who did not become
beneficiaries of the trust. Once the property belonged to a trustee, rather
than to a debtor, entity shielding prevented the debtor's creditors from
seizing the assets through the ordinary judicial process. Instead, these
creditors had to go through the process administered by the trustee.8 0
By the late 1600s, it was thus clear that the trust had developed a very
powerful system of asset partitioning.
2. Appearance in Joint-Stock Companies. - When the trust first
appeared in joint-stock companies in the late 1600s, it brought its asset-
partitioning features along with it. The evidence for this is somewhat
hard to see at first, but it grows increasingly clear over time, becoming
unambiguous by the early nineteenth century.
The reason the phenomenon is somewhat difficult to see in early
joint-stock companies is that very few unincorporated joint-stock
companies appeared in the Court of Chancery during the eighteenth
century, presumably because of the incompleteness of Chancery
reporting.8 1 There is, however, circumstantial evidence to suggest that
entrepreneurs expected to lock in their capital and prevent withdrawals.
Consider the water supply company from the important 1701 case
discussed above.18 2 The company had as many as 900 shareholders,183 but
it clearly did not expect these shareholders to be able to liquidate the
business at any time: The company had entered a lease for fifteen
years.18 4 The company had also committed under the lease to make a
huge up-front investment in the form of a lump-sum payment and
extensive infrastructure improvements.18 5 These investments would
presumably have taken years to produce a return, suggesting the
company's entrepreneurs expected to stay in business for a while. The
existence of this company and many others like it around the time
1 86
180. The fraudulent-transfer statutes discussed above would allow a creditor who did
not participate in the composition to void the debtor's transfers to the trust. For many
centuries, the central function of bankruptcy law was to undo the effect of these
fraudulent-transfer statutes in certain circumstances by making private compositions
binding even on the creditors who did not agree to them.
181. This claim is based on extensive digital searching of the English reports. The only
cases involving a company organized as a trust between 1722 and 1800 were Lynch v.
Dalzell (1729) 2 Eng. Rep. 292 (HL); 4 Bro. Parl. Cas. 431, and Horsley v. Bell (1778) 27
Eng. Rep. 494 (Ch); Amb. 770. The most likely explanation for the dearth of reports is
simply that Chancery reporting was inconsistent during this period, recording only a
fraction of the cases decided.
182. See supra section I.C (discussing City of London 11 (1702) 1 Eng. Rep. 727 (HL); 1
Bro. Parl. Cas. 516, the first reported case involving a business company organized as a
trust).
183. City of London 11, 1 Eng. Rep. at 727; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. at 516 (explaining that the
business had been divided into 900 shares).
184. City of London 1 (1701) 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (Ch) 870; 2 Vern. 421, 421-22.
185. Id. at 870; 2 Vern. At 421-22.
186. See Scott, Constitution and Finance, supra note 68, §§ ID, 1E, 5A, 5C, 5E (listing
trust-based joint-stock companies from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
2172 [Vol. 116:2145
THE COMMON LAW CORPORATION
suggests that even from the very dawn of trust-based joint-stock
companies, something like entity shielding was widely expected.
Additional evidence comes from Professors Freeman, Pearson, and
Taylor's recent survey of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century joint-
stock companies. They find that the vast majority of trust-based
companies declared in their deeds of settlement that they would exist
indefinitely.
187
By the early nineteenth century, the evidence that unincorporated
companies could lock in their capital becomes more direct. The clearest
evidence comes from the earliest treatises on partnership. In the first half
of the nineteenth century, partnership treatise writers uniformly agreed
that although the default rules of partnership allowed a partner to
withdraw his capital and dissolve the partnership at any time, this rule
could easily be changed by agreement. The partners merely had to
specify that their partnership would continue indefinitely or for a fixed
period of time. The Collyer treatise, for instance, observed that by
default "[a] partnership at will may be dissolved at the express desire, or
by the bankruptcy, outlawry, felony, or death of any of the parties."'
Notwithstanding this default, however, John Collyer said, "[T] he law...
has allowed [the partners], except in cases of bankruptcy ... or felony, to
qualify the causes of its dissolution. For instance, in the case of the death
of a partner, the partnership may ... continue [] beyond the legal period
of dissolution, in the hands of his children or representatives.""1 9 Further,
Collyer explained, a partnership could be created for a term, in which
case it would be dissolved only "by effluxion of time."90 Niel Gow took a
similar position in his treatise, arguing that even "[i] n the absence of an
express [contract], there may be an implied, contract, as to the time for
which a partnership shall endure ... ; and where that is the case, the
partnership cannot be destroyed by the act of the party until the
contemplated period arrives."191 Other partnership treatise writers
agreed.
19 2
centuries); see also Freeman et al., supra note 24, at 23-28 (describing the growth of joint-
stock companies in the eighteenth century).
187. Freeman et al., supra note 24, at 55.
188. John Collyer, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Partnership 58 (London, S. Sweet
1832).
189. Id. at 62.
190. Id.
191. Niel Gow, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Partnership 278 (London, Charles
Hunter 1823).
192. Andrew Bisset, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Partnership 55 (Harrisburg, Pa.,
I.G. McKinley &J.M.G. Lescure 1847) ("Where, as is frequently the case, a precise time is
fixed for the duration of the partnership, it is dissolved by the expiration or effluxion of
that time, if it do[es] not meet with an earlier legal termination."); Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Law of Partnership 403 (Bos., Charles C. Little & James Brown
1841) [hereinafter Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnership] ("[A] partnership
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A further obstacle to premature dissolution was the difficulty of
litigating over a dissolution. This became clear in Van Sandau v. Moore, an
1826 decision by Lord Chancellor Eldon.9 In Van Sandau, a shareholder
sought to withdraw his capital by dissolving the company that held it.
19 4
The shareholder argued that the company had specified no term of
existence and thus could be dissolved at will by any of the partners.19
The court held, however, that the shareholder could only force this
dissolution by serving process on each one of the company's 300
shareholders.1 96 For practical reasons, locating each one of these
hundreds of shareholders and serving process on them turned out to be
impossible, and so the company was allowed to continue in operation.
1 97
Van Sandau has sometimes been held up as a symbol of dysfunction
in the English court system,1 9 but in fact the doctrine behind it served an
important practical purpose: It locked in a company's capital. As we will
see below, the requirement that every shareholder be joined was unique
to dissolution proceedings-in most other proceedings the joinder of
every one of a business trust's stockholders was not required.1 99 The
functional logic of Van Sandau was thus to recognize dissolution as a
unique problem and to make capital difficult to withdraw. It thus
appeared, for all intents and purposes, that unincorporated companies
were able to lock in their capital as effectively as incorporated companies.
B. Limited Liability for Shareholders and Trustees
The trust also offered limited liability. The form of limited liability
the trust offered varied throughout history and was not always exactly like
the limited liability we now know in modern corporations. Nevertheless,
limited liability in the business trust was often at least as strong as in
corporations of the same periods, and sometimes stronger. Limited
liability in the trust was also almost always much stronger than it was in
the general partnership.
may expire by the mere efflux of the time, which limits and bounds its duration under the
terms of the original contract, by which it is created.").
193. Van Sandau v. Moore (1826) 38 Eng. Rep. 171 (Ch); 1 Russ. 441.
194. Id. at 171; 1 Russ. at 441.
195. Id. at 172; 1 Russ. at 443.
196. Id. at 173; 1 Russ. at 447.
197. Id. at 183; 1 Russ. at 474.
198. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade, Report on the Law of Partnership, HC, in 530
Parliamentary Papers 2, 3 (1837); Mahoney, supra note 23, at 888-89 (noting difficulties
that arose out of the court's view in Van Sandau).
199. Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings § 132 (Bos., Charles C. Little &
James Brown 2d ed. 1840) [hereinafter Story, Equity Pleadings] (describing partnership
dissolution as an exception to the general principle that partners did not all have to be
joined where they were too numerous). Lord Redesdale reached a similar conclusion,
saying that dissolution was one of only a small handful of circumstances in which
numerous partners actually had to be joined. John Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in
Suits in the Court of Chancery 416-17 (London,J. & W.T. Clarke 5th ed. 1827).
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1. The Evolution of Limited Liability. - The extent of limited liability
in the trust was uncertain before trust-based joint-stock companies first
appeared in the early 1700s because limited liability was simply not an
issue in early trust law. In the prototypical family gift trust of medieval
England, the trustee held only land, rather than active businesses, and so
the trustee rarely took on the sorts of liabilities that could spill onto
beneficiaries and necessitate limitations on their liabilities.
20 0
When the trust first appeared in joint-stock companies, however,
limited liability appeared almost immediately. At first, limited liability was
not the product of any deliberate policy decision. Rather, it was simply
implicit in the way trust property was deeded and titled. Recall from
section I.B that the central logic of trust law was that legal title belonged
to a trustee.201 Thus, a trustee was expected to contract in the trustee's
own name, rather than in the name of the trust or the beneficiaries. This
implied something rather extraordinary: The trustee-rather than the
beneficiaries-was personally liable for the trust's debts. Since the trustee
was both the owner of the trust's property and the signatory on its
contracts, it was the trustee who bore the liability for the trust's debts.
20 2
The U.S. Supreme Court would explain this logic in 1884: "When a
trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound no one is bound, for he has
no principal. '203 In other words, since a trustee contracts in his own
name, he is the only one bound by a contract entered on a trust's behalf.
Trustee personal liability remained the rule in the United States until
well into the twentieth century.
20 4
Although this system of personal liability was unfortunate for
trustees, it was a gift to beneficiaries because it gave them the functional
equivalent of limited liability. Basically, because the trustee was liable, the
beneficiaries were not. This became evident at the dawn of the joint-
stock-company era, as demonstrated in City of London, the water supply
case from 1701 discussed above.20 5 In that case, the named defendants
were the trustees, not the trust or the shareholders.20 6 And the plaintiff
200. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J.
625, 640-42 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian Basis] (discussing the passive
nature of early trustees and the disabling character of early trust fiduciary powers).
201. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining that a trustee owned legal
title, while a beneficiary owned equitable title).
202. For an early example, see Duke of Queensbury v. Cullen (1787) 1 Eng. Rep. 646
(HL) 652; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 396, 404-05.
203. Taylor v. Davis, 110 U.S. 330, 335 (1884). For another classic articulation of the
doctrine, see Hussey v. Arnold, 70 N.E. 87, 88 (Mass. 1904) ("Actions at law upon
[trustees'] contracts must be brought against them, and judgments run against them...
because the relations of the cestuis que trustent to their contracts are only equitable, and
do not subject them to proceedings in a court of common law .. "); see also Scott, Law of
Trusts, supra note 41, §§ 261-263.
204. Scott, Law of Trusts, supra note 41, §§ 261-263.
205. City of London 1 (1701) 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (Ch); 2 Vern. 421; see supra section I.C.
206. City of London , 23 Eng. Rep. at 871; 2 Vern. at 423.
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sued the trustees personally.0 7 The trustees tried to sidestep this liability
by saying that the shareholders should be liable instead. "Equity ought to
decree against the Cestuy que trust [i.e., the shareholders]," they argued,
"and not against the trustees."208 The courts, however, disagreed. To the
Lord Keeper in Chancery, the trustees' personal liability was self-evident.
In response to the trustees' argument that the beneficiaries rather than
the trustees should be personally liable, the Lord Keeper said simply,
"Sed non allocatur'-"It is not allowed.' 209 The report on appeal in the
House of Lords was more specific. The Lords agreed that the city's claim
was against the trustees, rather than the shareholders for whom the
trustees had acted because it was the trustees who held the lease.210 Thus,
while the trustees faced personal liability, the shareholders lost nothing,
allowing them the de facto equivalent of limited liability.
Eventually, however, the trust would lose this feature before partially
regaining it again in the early twentieth century. In the early nineteenth
century, courts began treating joint-stock-company trusts as though they
were partnerships for purposes of limited liability.21 The basic logic was
that partnership law treated all contractual arrangements that resembled
partnerships as though they were partnerships, and a business trust was a
contractual arrangement that resembled a partnership. This was an
important move, because partnership law held each of a business's
partners personally liable for the business's debts. Indeed, the whole
point of treating a business as a partnership was usually to make the
partners personally liable for the partnership's debts. This doctrinal shift
probably first appeared around the 1820s, since this was the time when
courts in England and the United States first began treating contractual
arrangements as partnerships even when the partners did not want to do
SO.
21 2
Shareholders of business trusts would not lose their limited liability
for long, however. Starting in 1856, the same year that Parliament gave
general limited liability to English corporations through the Limited
207. Id. at 871; 2 Vern. at 423.
208. Id. at 871; 2 Vern. at 423.
209. Id. at 871; 2 Vern. at 423.
210. City of London 11 (1702) 1 Eng. Rep. 727 (HL) 728; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 516, 518.
211. See, e.g., Taylor v. Davis, 110 U.S. 330, 337 (1884); Hussey v. Arnold, 70 N.E. 87,
88 (Mass. 1904); Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Grover, 75 N.W. 911, 916 (N.D. 1898); Duke
of Queensbury v. Cullen (1787) 1 Eng. Rep. 646 (HL) 651-52; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 396,
404-05.
212. See 3 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 26 (N.Y.C., 0. Halsted 2d ed.
1832); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Constructing Firms: Partnerships and Alternative
Contractual Arrangements in Early Nineteenth-Century American Business, 24 Bus. &
Econ. Hist. 43, 53 (1995). For English sources, see Holmes v. Higgins (1822) 107 Eng.
Rep. 28 (KB) 29; 1 B. & C. 74, 76; Charles Wordsworth, The Law ofJoint Stock Companies
226-39 (Phila.,John S. Little 3d ed. 1843). In any case, the doctrine was clearly in place by
the 1850s. See Coxv. Hickman (1860) 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (HL) 450; 8 H.L. Cas. 268, 314; Re
Stanton Iron Co. (1855) 52 Eng. Rep. 821 (Ch) 825; 21 Beav. 164, 173-74.
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Liability Act, 213 the English Chancery court and House of Lords began
returning limited liability to business trusts in the case of Cox v.
Hickman.214 In that case, the owners of an insolvent ironworks company
assigned all of their equity interest to a group of trustees, naming the
creditors of the business as the trust's beneficiaries.21 ' This was simply a
standard bankruptcy trust of the kind that had already been popular in
England for centuries. A question arose about limited liability, however,
because after the original owners assigned the business to the trustees,
the trustees did not liquidate the business but chose instead to continue
operating it for the benefit of the lenders.216 And in the process of
operating it, the trustees took on new lenders.21 7 The business continued
to struggle, however, and eventually became capable of paying neither
the new lenders nor the old ones for whose benefit the trust was
originally established.21 ' The new lenders thus sued the old ones, arguing
that by continuing to operate the business, the old lenders had become
not just trust beneficiaries but partners in the enterprise, with personal
liability for the partnership's new debts.
219
The judges who received the case were flummoxed. They were
forced to draw a line between the rules of conventional trust law, which
clearly protected beneficiaries from liability, and the rules of partnership
or so-called "business trust" law, which did not. The line between
ordinary trusts and business trusts had blurred in bankruptcy, and it was
unclear which set of rules should apply. After much debate, the House of
Lords came down in favor of giving the original creditors limited
liability.
220
The rule of limited liability that emerged from this case soon
jumped beyond trusts that had been organized specifically for insol-
vencies and began spreading to ordinary businesses that had been org-
anized as trusts originally. The spread was most pronounced on the
American side of the Atlantic. One of the first cases to establish the doc-
trine of limited liability in business trusts in America was Mayo v. Moritz,
an 1890 decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.2 1 In
213. Limited Liability Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 133. This act was superseded a year
later by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47. Limited liability was
available prior to 1855 but only by special act or charter. The 1855 Act offered limited
liability to all businesses registered as corporations. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 133, § ii.
214. 11 Eng. Rep. at 431; 8 H.L. Cas. at 268. Cox built on a related decision, Re
Stanton Iron Co. (1855) 52 Eng. Rep. 821; 21 Beav. 164.
215. Cox 11 Eng. Rep. at 432; 8 H.L. Cas. at 268-70.
216. Id. at 432; 8 H.L. Cas. at 268-70.
217. Id. at 432; 8 H.L. Cas. at 268-70.
218. Id. at 432; 8 H.L. Cas. at 268-70.
219. Id. at 433; 8 H.L. Cas. at 271.
220. Id. at 445; 8 H.L. Cas. at 278.
221. See 24 N.E. 1083, 1083 (Mass. 1890); see also Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v.
Grover, 75 N.W. 911, 912-13 (N.D. 1898) (citing Mayo, 24 N.E. at 1083).
20161 2177
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
that case, the court held that the shareholders of a patent trust had
limited liability for its debts.222 The Massachusetts court then clarified the
requirements for obtaining limited liability a few years later in Williams v.
Inhabitants of Milton in 1913 and in Frost v. Thompson in 1914, holding that
a business organized in trust was to be treated as a trust, rather than as a
partnership-and was thus to receive limited liability for its
shareholders-if the trust limited its shareholders' control.2 23 So long as
control belonged to the trustees, rather than to the shareholders, the
rules of trust law rather than partnership law applied. Commentators
thus began to say that a business trust with limited shareholder control
was a "true" or "pure" trust, capable of using the true rules of trust law,
while a business trust that gave shareholders significant control was
actually a partnership, subject to the rules of partnership law.224 The rule
of limited liability soon traveled beyond Massachusetts. Within a few
years, the courts of California,225 Illinois,226 Rhode Island,227 and
Arkansas22' had adopted it.
Some historians have read the limited-control requirement as a
harsh restriction that stripped shareholders of voting rights and have
concluded that the control requirement was, thus, unworkable.2 29 But
this was not actually so. In the doctrine's mature form in Massachusetts, it
merely required the same centralization of management hat prevails in a
modern corporation. In a modern corporation, the authority to make
decisions and enter contracts in the regular course of business belongs to
the board of directors, rather than to the stockholders.23 0 The stock-
holders have the right to elect the directors, but it is the directors who
ultimately hold control.231 This sets a modern corporation in contrast to
a modern partnership, in which the authority to manage the business
belongs to the partners, rather than to an elected board.
23 2
The mature version of the Massachusetts business-trust doctrines
merely required business trusts to adopt the same board-centered control
scheme as a modern corporation. In order to qualify for limited
222. Mayo, 24 N.E. at 1083.
223. Frost v. Thompson, 106 N.E. 1009, 1010 (Mass. 1914); Williams v. Inhabitants of
Milton, 102 N.E. 355, 359 (Mass. 1913).
224. See, e.g., Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 147 (1924).
225. See Goldwater v. Oltmann, 292 R 624, 629 (Cal. 1930).
226. See Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 159 N.E. 250, 253 (Ill. 1927).
227. See R.I. Hosp. Tr. Co. v. Copeland, 98A. 273, 279 (R.I. 1916).
228. See Betts v. Hackathorn, 252 SW. 602, 604-05 (Ark. 1923).
229. See Guinnane et al., supra note 23, at 695 n.15 ("in Britain and the United States
firms could also organize as joint stock companies and trusts .... In the latter investors
had so completely to relinquish managerial authority to the trustees that they were more
vulnerable to oppression than in any other form."); Silberstein-Loeb, supra note 22, at 205.
230. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
231. See id. § 141(b).
232. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-202 (2016).
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shareholder liability, a trust simply had to place the authority to manage
its business in a board of trustees. The shareholders of a Massachusetts
business trust could still retain a large measure of control by keeping the
right to elect the board, just as the shareholders might do in a modern
corporation. This became clear by 1925 in the case of Greco v. Hubbard.2"
In that case, the court explicitly compared a trust to a corporation,
observing that if the trust at issue "had been a corporation, no one would
contend that he relation of the defendants to it by electing new officers
after they became the stockholders would render them personally liable
for its debts."23 4 The court said it was the same for a trust: "Every
intendment of the law," the court insisted, "is toward the protection of
cestuis que trust [i.e., shareholders] under a valid trust."23 5 The Supreme
Court of California reached the same result five years later.23 6 By the
1920s, therefore, a business trust in Massachusetts enjoyed the same
limited liability as a business corporation in every American state today.
The principal weakness of the Massachusetts limited liability
doctrine was that it did not apply consistently across all of the states.
Although Massachusetts and California offered limited liability to both a
trust and a corporation, a number of state courts in the South refused to
honor the Massachusetts doctrine, including the courts of Florida,
23 7
Kentucky,238 Louisiana,
23 9 and, most prominently, Texas.
2 40
2. Limited Liability in Historical and Commercial Perspective. - The
trust's ability to offer limited liability in the early-twentieth-century
United States was thus somewhat inferior to that of modern corpo-
rations, but we should keep this inferiority in perspective and be cautious
not to overstate it. The corporation's superiority in terms of limited
liability is a phenomenon of rather recent vintage. For most of modern
history, the weakness of limited liability in the trust form did not put the
trust at a serious disadvantage to the corporation because limited liability
was weak in the corporation, too. Limited liability would not become a
common feature of special parliamentary acts of incorporation until the
233. 147 N.E. 272, 274-75 (Mass. 1925).
234. Id. at 275.
235. Id.
236. See Goldwater v. Oltmann, 292 R 624, 629-30 (Cal. 1930).
237. See Willey v. WI. Hoggson Corp., 106 So. 408, 411-12 (Fla. 1925) (holding that a
common law trust "is nothing but a veiled and futile effort to avoid the liabilities of a
copartnership and acquire the privileges and immunities of a corporation without
complying with the corporation laws of the state").
238. See Ing v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 287 SW. 960, 961 (Ky. 1926) ("It is a well settled
rule in this state that these unincorporated syndicates are simply partnerships and that
each member of the syndicate is liable personally for the debts of the syndicate.").
239. See Am. Nat'l Bank of Shreveport v. Reclamation Oil Producing Ass'n of La., 101
So. 10, 12 (La. 1924).
240. See Thompson v. Schmitt, 274 SW. 554, 559 (Tex. 1925).
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late eighteenth or early nineteenth century,241 and it would not become a
feature of England's general incorporation statutes until 1856242-almost
the same year that limited liability began to return to the trust form in
Cox v. Hickman.24' Additionally, there was a very long period-the entire
eighteenth century-during which the trust may have actually offered a
stronger form of limited liability than the corporation did. The water
supply case from 1702, for example, provided stockholders in a trust with
a form of limited liability that the corporate form would not widely
achieve until a hundred years later2
44
Note also that the tendency of trustees-as well as shareholders-to
become personally liable did not make the trust obviously inferior
because trustee liability had an analogue in contemporary corporations.
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, corporate
directors in both England and the United States were often personally
liable for the debts of a corporation just as trustees were liable for the
debts of a trust.2 45 Further, the trust's limited liability protections could
be strengthened contractually. If a trustee could convince a creditor to
contractually waive its right to recover against the personal assets of the
trustee and shareholders, then the creditor could not seize those
assets.246 This practice was already available in the United States by the
early nineteenth century, when trust shareholders were first being held
liable for business debts.247 And by the early twentieth century, it was
standard.24 Deeds of trust commonly required a trustee to obtain a
waiver of shareholder and trustee liability in all of the contracts the
trustee signed.
249
Contractual waivers of trustee liability were so common in business
trusts in the early-twentieth-century United States that a whole genre of
241. K.G. Davies, Joint-Stock Investment in the Later Seventeenth Century, 4 Econ.
Hist. Rev. 283, 293-94 (1952).
242. See Limited Liability Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 133.
243. (1860) 11 Eng. Rep. 431; 8 H.L. Cas. 268.
244. See City of London 11 (1702) 1 Eng. Rep. 727 (HL); 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 516.
245. 3 Seymour D. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Private Corporations
§ 4163, at 3059 (S.E, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1895) (observing that there existed in the
United States a "large body of statutes making directors or trustees of corporations ...
liable to pay the debts of the corporation which have been contracted by them during the
period of certain official defaults"); Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional
Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14J. Legal Stud. 129, 146 (1985).
246. 3 Kent, supra note 212, at 26-27 (explaining members of a private association can
limit their liability through contract).
247. Id.
248. Thompson, Business Trusts, supra note 148, at 14-15; Warren, supra note 148, at
384 (claiming "people are very familiar these days with ... and make no objection to"
contractual waivers of creditors' rights to recover against the personal assets of a trustee).
249. See, for example, the Keystone Manufacturing Company Agreement made in
1920. McCoy, supra note 148, at 193-99 (describing a clause in the Agreement waiving all
liability of the trustees for management of the trust).
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cases grew up around them. The courts concluded that a trustee could
usually limit his personal liability by simply writing the words "as trustee,
and not individually" next to his signature on a contract.250 Additionally,
by the early twentieth century in the United States, a trust instrument
could categorically enable third parties to recover from the trust fund
directly, rather than the trustee, making the trustee liable only if the trust
fund was inadequate.
251
These waivers of contractual liability worked quite well. This became
clear in the early twentieth century after the collapse of a whole industry
of companies known as "closed-end funds." Closed-end funds were
investment funds that bought stock in other companies and then issued
stock of their own to investors who wanted to invest broadly.252 Closed-
end funds were a big business in the 1920s. During the great bull market
of 1929, they issued nearly $3 billion of securities and accounted for
more than thirty percent of all new corporate issues in the United
States. 253 Crucially, many-perhaps most-of these funds were organized
as trusts. In the 1920s, the trust form was so prevalent among these funds
that they became known in popular parlance as "investment trusts,"
rather than "investment funds."
' 254
The closed-end fund industry collapsed in 1929 when the stock
market crashed, and the collapse sent shards of debt flying in every
direction. The capital structures of closed-end funds tended to include
elaborately tiered layers of bonds in addition to equity,255 and when the
250. The classic case is Shoe & Leather Nat'l Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148, 150 (1877);
see also Duvall v. Craig, 15 U.S. 45, 56 (1817); Rand v. Farquhar, 115 N.E. 286, 288 (Mass.
1917); Mitchell v. Whitlock, 28 S.E. 292, 292-93 (N.C. 1897). The body of rules about what
exactly was sufficient grew to be fairly detailed. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 148, at 197;
Scott, Law of Trusts, supra note 41, §§ 263, 263.2; Sears, supra note 148, §§ 33, 56, 75;
Warren, supra note 148, at 860.
251. See Scott, Law of Trusts, supra note 41, § 265.4; Sears, supra note 148, §§ 53-54
(describing a series of cases wherein trust agreements made the trust, rather than trustees,
directly liable). By the early twentieth century, this had become the default rule in
Massachusetts and other important American jurisdictions. See Frost v. Thompson, 106
N.E. 1009, 1010 (Mass. 1914); Wright v. Caney River Ry. Co., 66 S.E. 588, 590-91 (N.C.
1909); Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Grover, 75 N.W. 911, 912 (N.D. 1898); Dunn, supra
note 148, at 347; Scott, supra note 41, §§ 270-270.2; Wrightington, supra note 148, at
157-59.
252. John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Management
Regulation, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 341, 348 (2012).
253. SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 70, pt. 2, at
186 tbl.59, 190 tbl.60 (1939).
254. See, e.g., Cravath, supra note 145, at 14-15; Walter N. Durst, Analysis and
Handbook of Investment Trusts 5-6 (1932); Theodore J. Grayson, Investment Trusts,
Their Origin, Development and Operation 1 (1928); 1 C.R Keane, Keane's Manual of
Investment Trusts 550, 552-53 (1928); Williams, supra note 145, at 1-2.
255. The SEC estimated that debt and preferred stock accounted for approximately
fifty-six percent of the total assets of all leveraged closed-end funds in 1929. H.R. Doc. No.
70, pt. 2, at 140 tbl.33.
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stock market crashed in October of 1929, most closed-end funds either
dissolved or went bankrupt. 15
Remarkably, however, there is no evidence that the shareholders of
these funds ever became liable. Although the SEC spent years
investigating the fund industry's collapse and compiled a four-volume
report totaling thousands of pages to describe its findings,2 7 the SEC
never found any evidence of shareholder personal liability. The
shareholders must have been protected either because the funds had
centralized management structures that straightforwardly qualified them
for limited liability under Massachusetts precedents or because the
funds' debt contracts included waivers of shareholder liability. In either
case, the closed-end funds proved that trust-based businesses with
contractual debts could collapse on a massive scale and yet still leave
their shareholders unscathed.
To be sure, a contractual waiver of shareholder liability had limits.
Most importantly, it could not eliminate a shareholder's noncontractual
liabilities for torts and taxes.258 But this was not a serious problem prior
to the early twentieth century. Tort liability was extremely rare prior to
the mid-nineteenth century,259 and the doctrines of tort law remained
poorly developed up through at least the early twentieth century.260 Tax
liability was also relatively insignificant. Although the United Kingdom
adopted a corporate income tax in 1803, its rates remained low for at
least a century.261 And the United States did not successfully tax
corporate income until 1909-even then, the rates were very low by
modern standards.
262
Thus, by the 1920s, many practitioners were counseling their clients
that although shareholders of a business trust might run a small risk of
tort or governmental liability if they chose the trust form over the
corporate form, these risks were small enough that they were worth
256. Morley, supra note 252, at 353.
257. See H.R. Doc. No. 70, pt. 2.
258. See Warren, supra note 148, at 384 (explaining a trust could not eliminate
liability for taxes or for claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act).
259. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 222-23, 350 (3d ed.
2005); John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic 4-6 (2004) (describing the
development of tort law after the U.S. Civil War); Richard A. Epstein, The Historical
Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 Ga. L. Rev. 775, 777-
86 (1982) (describing the moderate expansion of tort liability to employers in the mid- to
late nineteenth century).
260. See G. Edward White, The Emergence and Doctrinal Development of Tort Law,
1870-1930, 11 U. St. Thomas L.J. 463, 483 (2014) (describing the "favorable environment
for the filing of tort claims for personal injuries" that developed "in the latter decades of
the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth").
261. See Steven A. Bank, Anglo-American Corporate Taxation 24-26, 49-54 (2011)
(describing the development of the United Kingdom's corporate tax and the subsequent
rise of progressive taxation).
262. See id. at 70-71.
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running. Edward Warren, a professor at Harvard Law School, wrote up a
fictional dialogue between a lawyer and his entrepreneur clients to
illustrate the advantages of the trust form. 263 The dialogue showed the
lawyer counseling the clients that the risks of personal liability in the
trust form were not meaningful.264 In the dialogue, the lawyer says,
[T]he only possible risk would be with claims not based on
contract, say, a claim against you under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, or a claim for taxes. As to such claims, you
would be entitled to use up the whole of the trust funds, if
necessary, to protect yourselves. So the only risk is that there
might be some such claim which was bigger than the trust fund.
The risk seems a small one.
265
The client replies, "It sounds almost too good to be true."
266
Trustee liability was probably not a serious problem up through the
early twentieth century for the same reasons that shareholder liability was
not a serious problem. Contractual waivers were apparently effective
enough that the risk of personal liability did not make it difficult to find
trustees. In the eighteenth century, it was common for unincorporated
companies to enlist local aristocrats and other men of high prestige to
serve as trustees.267 Later on, companies would draw their trustees from
the ranks of company secretaries and other administrators who may have
been judgment proof and whose sole job was to follow the instructions of
a board of directors.268 Personal liability for trustees was largely elimi-
nated by statute in most American jurisdictions in the second half of the
twentieth century.
269
C. Legal Personhood in Litigation
Of all the trust's purported weaknesses, the one that has loomed
largest in the eyes of recent scholars is the trust's inability to achieve legal
personhood in litigation.270 Legal personhood in litigation was important
263. Warren, supra note 148, at 383-84.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 384.
266. Id.
267. See Freeman et al., supra note 24, at 41 (describing the popularity of the trust
form as a result of business efforts to increase the likelihood of securing incorporation);
Chantal Stebbings, The Private Trustee in Victorian England, at i (2002) (describing the
popularity of the trust form as a result of efforts of the Victorian middle class to preserve
wealth).
268. See Blundell v. Winsor (1837) 59 Eng. Rep. 238 (Ch) 238-39; 8 Sim. 601, 601-02
(describing a company that appointed its treasurer as trustee); Harrison v. Heathorn
(1843) 134 Eng. Rep. 817 (CP) 822-23; 6 Man. & G. 81, 95 (same).
269. See Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust, supra note 112, at 434-35
(describing trustee immunity from personal contract liability in Massachusetts).
270. See Harris, industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 153-54 (describing
trustees' exposure to personal liability); Mahoney, supra note 23, at 887-88 (describing
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because from early modern times, the rules of equity procedure
technically required every person who was interested in a suit to be
joined to the suit as a party.271 That is, if a plaintiff sued a trust with many
beneficiaries, each one of the beneficiaries would have to be named as a
defendant and served with process.
If applied literally to an unincorporated joint-stock company, this
rule made litigation impossible because it would have required personal
service of process-a very difficult task in the days before email-on
every one of the company's shareholders. If the shareholders numbered
in the hundreds or thousands, as they often did, then serving each one of
these shareholders with process was effectively impossible.2 72 Recent
historians thus have regarded the corporate form as a major innovation
because the corporate form allowed a business to litigate in its own
name.273 In a suit involving a corporation, the interested party was the
corporation, not the shareholders, and so the corporation could litigate
withoutjoining any of the shareholders.
274
It turns out, however, that as a practical matter, the trust was almost
as good as the corporation in this regard. From almost the moment the
trust first appeared in joint-stock companies around the turn of the
eighteenth century, the trust exploited a set of exceptions to the general
rule of joinder. Although the rules of equity procedure technically
required all of ajoint-stock company's shareholders to be joined in most
lawsuits involving the company, the courts of equity understood that this
rule was impractical. The courts opened up gigantic exceptions that had
the practical impact of waiving the joinder of a trust's shareholders in
almost every instance in whichjoinder would have been impractical.
The exceptions to the general rule ofjoinder emerged in a variety of
settings. One of the simplest was in cases in which the parties to a dispute
were overseas. If the partners of a partnership or the beneficiaries of a
trust were found to be in India or the Caribbean, for example, a court
would not insist on joining them, so long as they were adequately
represented by others.
275
Parliament's ban on legal personhood for unincorporated companies as an effort to
eliminate them).
271. See Story, Equity Pleadings, supra note 199, §§ 72-76 (explaining equity requires
that "all persons, whose interests are immediately connected" with a case and who are
"affected by it, shall be provided for").
272. See Van Sandau v. Moore (1826) 38 Eng. Rep. 171 (Ch) 173; 1 Russ. 441, 447
(denying relief to plaintiff who chose "to file a bill against between two and three hundred
[d]efendants").
273. See Harris, industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 159-66 (describing the
comparative advantages of litigation involving unincorporated entities); Mahoney, supra
note 23, at 877 (explaining how modern statutes enable the corporation to become "a
legal person entitled to own assets and sue and be sued in its own name").
274. See Mahoney, supra note 23, at 877.
275. See Good v. Blewitt (1807) 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (Ch) 345; 13 Ves. Jr. 397, 401
(seamen); AG v. Baliol Coll. (1744) 88 Eng. Rep. 538 (Ch) 539; 9 Mod. 407, 409 (out-of-
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Another exception arose in trusts for the benefit of creditors.2 7 6 As
observed above,277 from at least early modern times, borrowers
commonly conveyed assets to trustees for the benefit of creditors in order
to secure loans, manage bankruptcies, or render land reachable by
creditors at death. In many of these trusts, the creditors who were named
as beneficiaries were so numerous and so spread out thatjoining them all
in disputes with outsiders or with the trustee or other creditors became
impossible. Hence, by the late 1600s, the Chancery was routinely waiving
joinder of the creditors in these trusts.27 Similar waivers would later be
used to massive effect when American railroads began using the trust to
issue corporate bonds to thousands of creditors in the mid-nineteenth
century.
279
Thus, by at least the early eighteenth century, the Chancery had
developed a vast set of exceptions to the joinder rule that allowed parties
in interest to be waived wherever the parties were too numerous to be
joined. This became very important for the trust-based joint-stock
companies that emerged around this time. Justice Story, the great
nineteenth-century treatise writer and Justice of the American Supreme
Court, summarized the doctrine for joint-stock company shareholders in
1840: It was a rule "of Courts of Equity, that where the parties are so
numerous, as to render it inconvenient or impracticable, that they
should be parties to the record; if they all have one common interest, a few
may sue on behalf of themselves and all the other members of the company."
' 280
This doctrine appeared at the very birth of trust-based joint-stock
companies in the early 1700s. In the water supply company case from
1701, City of London, the city filed its complaint against the company's
trustees and a handful of stockholders, rather than against all of its
kingdom university); Quintine v. Yard (1702) 21 Eng. Rep. 886 (Ch) 886; 1 Eq. Ab. 74, 74
(beneficiaries in Barbados); Cowslad v. Cely (1698) 24 Eng. Rep. 40 (Ch) 40; Fin. Pr. 83, 83
(co-executor in foreign country); Walley v. Walley (1687) 23 Eng. Rep. 609 (Ch) 610; 1
Vern. 484, 487 (executor in Indies).
276. See Cockburn v. Thompson (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch) 1008; 16 Ves. Jr. 321,
328 (permitting a residuary beneficiary of a trust to file suit on behalf of all residuary
beneficiaries); Story, Equity Pleadings, supra note 199, § 76(b) (" [Tirustees for the
payment of debts and legacies may sustain a suit, either as plaintiffs or as defendants,
touching the trust estate, without bringing the creditors or legatees before the Court as
parties.").
277. See supra notes 175-179 and accompanying text (discussing "composition"
arrangements).
278. See Barker v. Wyld (1682) 23 Eng. Rep. 373 (Ch) 373; 1 Vern. 140, 140; see also
Cockburn, 33 Eng. Rep. at 1007; 16 Ves. Jr. at 327 (waiving the joinder of shareholders in a
joint-stock company and referring to "the familiar case of creditors" as precedent).
279. See Shaw v. Norfolk R.R., 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 162, 170 (1855) (waiving joinder of
all of the bondholders in litigation over a bond default); Bd. of Supervisors v. Mineral
Point R.R., 24 Wis. 93, 132 (1869) (same).
280. Story, Equity Pleadings, supra note 199, § 115 (emphasis added) (discussing
Small v. Attwood (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 684 (Ch); 6 Cl. & F 232).
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stockholders.8 1 The trustees then defended by saying that all of the
company's stockholders had to be joined before the suit could
proceed. 2 2 Because there were 900 shares outstanding, the trustees knew
that requiring the plaintiff to join all of the shareholders would make the
suit impossible.
The Lord Keeper in Chancery understood the effect of requiring
joinder, however, and he thus refused to apply the general rule of
joinder. The trustees, the Lord Keeper observed, "by dividing of [the
lease] into so many shares, had made it impracticable to have them all
before the court.'28 3 The Lord Keeper thus simply waived the joinder
requirement and let the suit proceed against the trustees alone.2 4 The
House of Lords later upheld the Lord Keeper's decision, saying that to
bring all the shareholders to a hearing "could not be done, and would
render it impossible for the respondents ever to recover."' 21 Twenty years
later in 1722, the Chancellor reached a similar result for a joint-stock
company and its shareholders in the case of Chancey v. May.2 6 The courts
had thus said that whenever joinder was impractical because the
stockholders were too numerous, it would not be required. This ripped
open a huge hole that left the general rule ofjoinder in tatters.
The rule was reaffirmed again at the beginning of the nineteenth
century2 7 in a series of Chancery opinions that were well known to
commentators at the time but that have received almost no attention
from recent historians. The first of these opinions appeared in 1805 and
was written by Lord Chancellor Eldon in the case of Adair v. New River
C0.288 In that case, Lord Eldon waived the joinder of a group of
stockholders in an unincorporated company, reasoning that the
shareholders were too numerous to be joined and that "where it is
impracticable," the rule requiringjoinder "shall not be pressed."2 9 It was
enough, Lord Eldon said, for a plaintiff to "bring[] all whom he can
bring" of the stockholders.29 Lord Eldon reached the same result again
281. See City of London 1 (1701) 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (Ch) 870; 2 Vern. 421, 422.
282. Id. at 870; 2 Vern. at 421, 422.
283. Id. at 871; 2 Vern. at 422.
284. Id. at 871; 2 Vern. at 423.
285. City of London 11 (1702) 1 Eng. Rep. 727 (HL) 728; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 516, 518.
286. (1722) 24 Eng. Rep. 265 (Ch) 265; Fin. Pr. 592, 592.
287. It is difficult to say what happened to the numerosity exception between Chancey
v. May in 1722 and the end of the eighteenth century because, as noted above, supra note
181, very few trusts appeared in the reports of chancery proceedings between 1722 and
the early nineteenth century.
288. (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch); 11 Ves. Jr. 429. The New River Company had
been incorporated by royal charter pursuant to a scheme in which the Crown would
receive a share in the company equal to one half of its annual profits. Id. at 1153; 11 Ves.
Jr. at 429. Subsequently, the profits interest was divided up into shares distributed to "100
[persons] or a much greater number." Id. at 1153; 11 Ves.Jr. at 429.
289. Id. at 1159; 11 Ves.Jr. at 444.
290. Id. at 1159; 11 Ves.Jr. at 444.
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four years later in two more cases, Pearce v. Piper and Cockburn v.
Thompson.9 1 In Cockburn, a mutual annuity company broke down into
litigation between its promoters and some of the mutual shareholders.
The promoters retreated to the familiar procedural argument, claiming
that the suit could not proceed unless all of the mutual shareholders
were joined by name.29 2 Lord Eldon refused to go along, however. He
took note of the explosive growth of trust-based companies in early-
nineteenth-century London and said that if what the defendants argued
were true and people who sued these companies had to join all of their
shareholders, then "with regard to all those Institutions [i.e., trust-based
joint-stock companies], known to subsist in this great metropolis in the
nature of partnership[,j ... if they have not a corporate character, no law
can be administered in any Court of Justice among the members of such
Societies."2 9 The companies, in other words, would become lawless, and
the Chancellor refused to let that happen. In addition to this practical
argument, Lord Eldon also made a doctrinal argument. Referring to "the
familiar case of creditors," Lord Eldon reminded the litigants that the
trust had long been used to structure credit relationships and that the
joinder of the creditors in these relationships had long been waived if the
creditors were numerous.
294
The rule in Cockburn soon caught on. The most influential
development came in 1818, when the Master of the Rolls decided Meux v.
Maltby, a case involving a dock company organized as a trust.295 Citing
Cockburn and several other cases taken from the trust's long history in
credit relationships, the court held that in each of these various cases,
practical considerations had long ago permitted waiving the joinder of
trust beneficiaries.29 6 The Master also cited the two unincorporated joint-
stock company cases from the early 1700s, including the water supply
case, to hold that waiver was long-established doctrine.
297
The doctrine waiving joinder of shareholders soon crossed the
Atlantic. In the 1816 case of Van Vechten v. Terry, New York Chancellor
291. Cockburn v. Thompson (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch); 16 Ves. Jr. 321; Pearce v.
Piper (1809) 34 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch); 17 Ves.Jr. 1.
292. Cockburn 33 Eng. Rep. at 1006; 16 Ves.Jr. at 322-23.
293. Id. at 1006; 16 Ves.Jr. at 324.
294. Id. at 1007; 16 Ves. Jr. at 327. Contemporary treatises likewise acknowledged that
creditors could sue on behalf of a large group of creditors without joining other creditors.
See, e.g., Denis George Lube, An Analysis of the Principles of Equity Pleading 188-89
(London, S. Sweet 1823); John Whitworth, Equity Precedents 288, 309, 316 (Phila., T. &
J.W.Johnson 1848).
295. (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (Ch); 2 Swanst. 277.
296. Id. at 623-25; 2 Swanst. at 282-87.
297. Id. at 623-25; 2 Swanst. at 282-87. (citing Adair v. New River Co. (1805) 32 Eng.




James Kent, the leading figure in contemporary American law,298 waived
thejoinder of 250 shareholders in an unincorporated joint-stock banking
company.299 Like Lord Eldon, Kent explained his reasoning in practical
terms:
The trustees are sufficient for the purpose of this bill . . . [It
would be intolerably oppressive and burdensome, to compel the
plaintiffs to bring in all the cestui que trusts [i.e., the share-
holders]. The delay, and the expense incident to such a
proceeding, would be a reflection on the justice of the Court.
This is one of those cases in which the general rule cannot, and
need not be enforced; for the trustees sufficiently represent all
the interests concerned; they were selected by the association
for that purpose, and we need not look beyond them.
3 00
By the 1830s, the numerosity exception had completely swallowed
the general rule ofjoinder. Although it is possible to find cases that came
out differently,3 0 1 most courts were routinely waiving joinder of joint-
stock company shareholders.3 0 2 Crucially, the courts waived joinder in
cases involving every possible combination of plaintiffs and defendants,
including cases in which the company was litigating with outsiders and
cases in which the company's shareholders were in litigation with each
other or with the trustees.03
The vast scope of the numerosity exception became clear in 1840,
when Justice Story published his landmark treatise on equity pleading in
English and American law.304 Justice Story devoted just four pages to
articulating the general rule ofjoinder and 127 pages to enumerating its
298. See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93
Colum. L. Rev. 547, 548 (1993).
299. 2Johns. Ch. 197,197-98 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., Deeks v. Stanhope (1844) 60 Eng. Rep. 278 (Ch) 282-85; 14 Sim. 57,
66-75; Leigh v. Thomas (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch) 201-02; 2 Ves. Sen. 312, 313.
302. See, e.g., Walker v. Miller & Co., 11 Ala. 1067, 1085-87 (1847); Willis v.
Henderson, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 13, 20 (1842); Willink v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 4 N.J.
Eq. 377, 398 (Ch. 1843); Cross v.Jackson, 5 Hill 478, 480 (N.Y. 1843); Townsend v. Goewey,
19 Wend. 424, 430 (N.Y. 1838); Stimson v. Lewis, 36 Vt. 91, 91 (1863); Richardson v.
Hastings (1844) 49 Eng. Rep. 1089 (Ch) 1091-92; 7 Beav. 323, 327-31; Benson v. Hadfield
(1842) 49 Eng. Rep. 690 (Ch) 693; 5 Beav. 546, 554; Taylor v. Salmon (1838) 41 Eng. Rep.
53 (Ch) 53; 4 My. & Cr. 134, 134; Fenn v. Craig (1838) 160 Eng. Rep. 680 (Ex Ct) 680; 3 Y.
& C. Ex. 216, 216; Gillett v. Abbott (1838) 112 Eng. Rep. 665 (KB) 665; 7 A. & E. 783, 783;
Mare v. Malachy (1836) 40 Eng. Rep. 490 (Ch) 498; 1 My. & Cr. 559, 579; Walburn v.
Ingilby (1833) 47 Eng. Rep. 96 (Ch) 96; Coop. temp. Brough. 270, 270; Small v. Attwood
(1832) 159 Eng. Rep. 1051 (Ex Ct) 1072; 1 You. 407, 457-59; Hitchens v. Congreve (1828)
38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch) 922; 4 Russ. 562, 576; Baldwin v. Lawrence (1824) 57 Eng. Rep. 251
(Ch) 254-55; 2 Sim. & St. 18, 27; Jones v. Garcia del Rio (1823) 37 Eng. Rep. 1113 (Ch)
1113; Turn. & R. 297, 297.
303. See Carlisle v. Se. Ry. Co. (1850) 41 Eng. Rep. 1432 (Ch) 1436; 1 Mac. & G. 689,
698; Richardson v. Larpent (1843) 63 Eng. Rep. 227 (Ch) 230; 2 Y & C. Ch. Cas. 507, 513;
Preston v. Grand Collier Dock Co. (1840) 59 Eng. Rep. 900 (Ch) 906; 11 Sim. 327, 344.
304. See Story, Equity Pleadings, supra note 199.
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various exceptions.0 5 And Justice Story was not alone. By the second
quarter of the nineteenth century, all of the leading English and
American treatises on equity procedure, including those by George
Cooper, Basil Montagu, and Lord Redesdale, described the joinder rule's
exceptions in a huge variety of contexts, ranging from insolvency to
unincorporated joint-stock companies.3 06 Charles Wordsworth's treatise
on the Law of Joint Stock Companies described the exception in similarly
broad terms.
30 7
By the 1830s, the only setting in which the joinder requirement
remained serious was in petitions for dissolution.3 08 Several treatises on
equity pleading identified petitions for dissolution as a kind of exception
to the exception: Although a trust-based company did not usually have to
join its stockholders if the stockholders were too numerous, it
nevertheless did have to join them in petitions for dissolution.3 0 9 This was
what motivated Lord Eldon's opinion in Van Sandau v. Moore, in which
one shareholder sought to dissolve the company and the court required
joinder of the rest.3 10 As we have already seen, this exception to the
exception was not an instance of doctrinal breakdown or judicial
dysfunction-it was a rule with a great deal of practical sense.3 1' The rule
in Van Sandau made sense because it helped to lock in capital.
Another area of controversy involved suits in which shareholders of a
trust-based joint-stock company sued each other, rather than suing or
being sued by third-party outsiders. When trusts reappeared in the equity
courts in the early nineteenth century, some rulings suggested that a
company organized in trust had to be dissolved before the shareholders
could sue each other312 This rule soon disappeared, however. Lord
Langdale, the Master of the Rolls, would make this clear in the case of
Richardson v. Hastings in 1844.313 After observing that some courts had
required a company to be dissolved before the shareholders could sue
305. See id. §§ 74-204 (discussing joint-stock companies in sections 107-119).
306. See George Cooper, A Treatise of Pleading on the Equity Side of the High Court
of Chancery 185-87 (N.Y.C., I. Riley 1813); John Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in
Suits in the Court of Chancery 164-81 (London, George Jeremy ed., J. & W.T. Clarke 4th
ed. 1827) (1782); 1 Basil Montagu, A Digest of Pleading in Equity 58-60 (London, J. &
W.T. Clarke 1824).
307. See Wordsworth, supra note 212, at 226-32.
308. See Evans v. Stokes (1836) 48 Eng. Rep. 215 (Ch) 218; 1 Keen 24, 32-33; Long v.
Yonge (1830) 57 Eng. Rep. 827 (Ch) 833-34; 2 Sim. 369, 385-87.
309. See Mitford, supra note 306, at 163-65 (noting that "all persons materially
interested in the subject ought generally to be parties to the suit ... however numerous
they may be"); Story, Equity Pleadings, supra note 199, §§ 130-133.
310. Van Sandau v. Moore (1826) 38 Eng. Rep. 171 (Ch) 180; 1 Russ. 441, 465-66.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 198-199 (discussing the rule in Van Sandau).
312. See Report on the Bd. of Trade, supra note 198, at 3.
313. (1844) 49 Eng. Rep. 1089 (Ch); 7 Beav. 323.
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each other, Lord Langdale said, "it now appears very clear that there is
no such rule." 14 He went on,
It has been decided, that in a continuing partnership, if a few
have an interest in a particular subject adverse to all the rest,
and claim for themselves the benefit of that interest, a bill may
be filed against those few, by one or more partners on behalf of
themselves and all the rest.3
15
Remarkably, none of these developments that permitted trust-based
companies to litigate has made it into recent historiography. The reason,
perhaps, is the outsize prominence in modern scholarship of an 1837
document called the Report on the Law of Partnership.16 Commissioned by
the Board of Trade, an institution that Parliament briefly empowered to
charter corporations in the 1830s,317 the report's principal argument was
that the law of partnership required reform or replacement by
incorporation because unincorporated joint-stock companies could not
sue or be sued in their own names or the names of the trustees.3 8 The
report was influential in the mid-1800s and has loomed even larger in the
work of modern historians.
3 19
In reality, however, the report was simply wrong, or at least
profoundly incomplete. Amazingly, at a time when practitioner treatises
were treating the waiver of shareholder joinder as settled doctrine, the
report failed to cite any of the cases discussed above. The report based its
claims about the difficulty of litigation by joint-stock companies mainly
on second-hand anecdotes from lawyers that the author of the report
had interviewed and on an overly strong generalization of the result in
Van Sandau, the dissolution case.32 Though the report did cite a few
cases that required companies to dissolve before shareholders could sue
each other,321 it did not cite the cases that held the opposite, and it did
not foresee Lord Langdale's declaration as Master of the Rolls just a few
years later that dissolution in intershareholder lawsuits was no longer
required.
3 22
If any doubt remained about whether unincorporated joint-stock
companies could sue without joining their shareholders in litigation,
Parliament would remove this doubt in 1852 by passing a statute that
confirmed the right of trustees to litigate in their own names without
314. Id. at 1091; 7 Beav. at 328.
315. Id. at 1091; 7 Beav. at 328.
316. Bd. of Trustees, supra note 198.
317. See 6 Geo. 4 c. 91 (1825). Parliament authorized the Board of Trade to grant
charters of incorporation in the same statute that repealed the Bubble Act. Id.
318. See Bd. of Trade, supra note 198, at 6-8.
319. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 23, at 889-90.
320. See Bd. of Trade, supra note 198, at 6-8.
321. See id. at 3 n.*.
322. See supra notes 313-315 and accompanying text (discussing Lord Langdale's
opinion in Richardson v. Hastings (1844) 49 Eng. Rep. 1089 (Ch); 7 Beav. 323).
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joining stockholders.3 23 Many American state legislatures soon followed
with similar statutes in the second half of the nineteenth century.
3 24
With that said, the rights of a trust-based company in litigation were
not quite as strong as those of a corporation. Unlike a corporation, a
trust had no direct right to bring a suit in its own name. Instead, a trust
had to rely on a judge to apply an exception to a general rule. But by at
least the 1830s, the exception had essentially become the rule.
D. Tradable Shares
The trust form also allowed tradable shares. The ability to buy and
sell shares is useful to investors because it allows investors to convert their
holdings into cash even as a company continues to own and employ the
underlying capital. If, for example, the entrepreneur who founded the
water supply company from the 1702 Chancery case wanted to retire, he
might wish to turn his twenty-six percent equity interest in the business
into cash to fund his retirement. If he could not sell his shares, his only
option would be to ask the business to buy him out. This action, in turn,
might destroy the business, since the only way the business could raise
the cash might be to sell off the water pipes and other assets that allowed
the business to operate. If the entrepreneur could sell his shares,
however, then someone else could buy the shares from him and the
company could continue to own its equipment and operate as before.
Scholars have long viewed the capacity to trade shares as a key innovation
of the corporate form, because traditional partnership law created a set
of problems that made it difficult for partners to trade their shares.3 25 It
turns out, however, that the trust solved these problems just as well as the
corporation, and the trust is still used in businesses with tradable shares
today. 
3 26
1. Charitable Enterprise. - The innovations that enabled tradable
shares in the business trust actually first appeared in charitable trusts.
From the late Middle Ages to at least the mid-nineteenth century, the vast
bulk of England's charitable assets belonged to trusts, rather than to
323. Chancery Procedure Act 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86.
324. The first statute to do this was New York's famous Field Code, which was the first
statutory system of procedural rules-outside of Louisiana-in either England or the
United States. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1, 9-10 (1989); see N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc. § 599 (1850) ("An executor or administrator, a
trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorised by statute, may sue without
joining with him the persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted."). Other states
soon adopted codes of procedure with similar provisions. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 378 (1872); Mo. Rev. Stat. art. 2, § 2 (1855); N.C. Code of Civ. Proc. § 57 (1868).
325. See Harris, industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 142.
326. For example, the Mesabi Trust, a New York Stock Exchange-listed trust, was set
up to receive royalties from a mining operating in Minnesota. See Mesabi Tr., Annual
Report of the Trustees of Mesabi Trust (Form 10-K) exh. 13, at 15 (Apr. 15, 2015).
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corporations.3 27 Trustees in England held the property of monastic
orders,3 28 protestant churches,3 29 fraternal organizations,330 guilds,331 and
societies for the benefit of the poor.3 3 2 Trustees even held the property of
the Catholic Church in England after the reformation deprived the
Church of its incorporated legal status.
33 3
The trust's most basic function in these enterprises was to
consolidate title in the names of the trustees. In Anglo-American law,
property is owned by a specific legal person. It must be conveyed or titled
in somebody's name. This created a problem in charities because it was
often unclear just whose name this should be. If a charity had multiple
beneficiaries, should each beneficiary be named on the deed? Under the
rules of joint tenancy, a conveyance had to include the name of every
single joint tenant.3 3 4 But naming every beneficiary as a joint tenant was
impossible because the beneficiaries often changed over time, as in
guilds and monasteries, or were simply impossible to identify in advance,
as in programs for the relief of the poor.
Charities dealt with this problem by titling their property in the
names of trustees, who could then convey title later on in their own
names.3 3 5 This was crucial because it eliminated the need for bene-
ficiaries to sign conveyances. A charitable trust did not have to bother
trying to track down each of the beneficiaries when it wanted to sell a
piece of property because the title legally belonged only to the trustees.
2. Commercial Enterprise. - When the trust made its leap from
charity to commerce at the end of the seventeenth century, one of its
main contributions was to solve a similar problem in identifying
numerous beneficiaries-though in the case of businesses, the
beneficiaries were known as shareholders or partners. Like the law of
joint tenancy, the common law of partnership required each of the
327. Gareth Jones, History of the Law of Charity: 1532-1827, at 6 (1969) (stating that
the bulk of charitable endowment was sheltered through the "use" or "trust").
328. See, e.g., Prioress of Thetford v. Wychyngham (1426) 10 Selden Society 119
(1896); Maitland, supra note 22, at 338-39.
329. See, e.g., AG v. Floyer (1716) 23 Eng. Rep. 1090 (Ch) 1090; 2 Vern. 748, 748; AG
v. Gouge, YB 8 Car. 1, fol. 116, Hil., pl. 172 (1633) (Ex Ct) (Eng.), reprinted in 118 Selden
Society 643, 643 (2001).
330. See, e.g., R v. Cain (1841) 169 Eng. Rep. 81 (Ch) 81; 2 Mod. 204, 205; Todd v.
Emly (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 832 (Ex Ct) 834; 7 M. & W. 425, 427.
331. Shaw Livermore, Early American Land Companies: Their Influence on Corporate
Development 17 (1939).
332. See, e.g., Love v. Eade (1676) 23 Eng. Rep. 147 (Ch) 147; Fin. 269, 269 (alleging
a breach of trust in a trust for the benefit of the poor of a parish).
333. Maitland, supra note 22, at 358, 364.
334. See DuBois, supra note 23, at 217-19 (describing the difficulties of conveying
property without use of a trust).
335. Cf. id. at 217 (explaining that the trustee device was used to overcome difficulties
involved in managing organizations).
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owners' names to appear on a deed or conveyance.3 3 6 A partnership, in
other words, had to own property not in its own name but in the
common names of all of the various partners 7.3 3 The rules of property law
thus required that whenever a partnership bought or sold property, each
partner had to put his signature or seal on the deed. Buying and selling
property in a large partnership thus posed the same conceptual problem
as buying and selling property in a charity: A partnership had to track
down each one of its partners personally in order to convey or receive
title.3 38 As the number of stockholders in unincorporated businesses
spiraled upward around the turn of the eighteenth century-recall that
the water supply company of 1702 potentially had as many as 900
shareholders339-getting each partner to sign every conveyance became
impossible. Share tradability supercharged this problem. In an
unincorporated joint-stock company with tradable shares, the partners
were not just numerous but highly transitory as well: New partners
constantly came in and old ones constantly left as shares were bought
and sold. In theory, under the default rules of property law, a partnership
with tradable shares might have had to update its titles and deeds to
reflect the changes in the partnership every day.
3 40
Businesses learned to solve this problem, however, the same way that
charities did-by titling their property in the names of trustees. When a
business gave its property to a trustee, the business no longer needed the
signatures of its partners on deeds and conveyances because the
signatures of the trustees were enough.3 41 A business could have 900
shareholders-but only a handful of trustees. The trust was especially
useful for businesses with tradable shares because a trust instrument
could easily accommodate constant shifts in the partnership. Trust law
had always permitted unknown and contingent beneficiaries.3 42 And so
just as a grandfather could create a trust for his unborn future
grandchildren, so too could an entrepreneur create a trust for
unidentified future shareholders.3 43 And if, by chance, a single partner
took conveyance of property that should have been shared with the full
336. Id. at 217-19.
337. See Bisset, supra note 192, at 47; Joseph Dixon, A Treatise on the Law of
Partnership 48-52 (London, Butterworths 1866) (describing the rights of partners in
relation to property); Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, supra note 192,
§ 92.
338. DuBois, supra note 23, at 217-19.
339. City of London 1 (1701) 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (Ch) 870; 2 Vern. 421, 422.
340. Id. at 870; 2 Vern. 421, 422.
341. See DuBois, supra note 23, at 217-19 (describing how the trust made it easier to
develop larger partnerships).
342. See, e.g., Lloyd Bonfield, Marriage Settlements: 1601-1740, at 1-2 (2008)
(describing the use of the trust in marriage settlements in the late Middle Ages to create
beneficial interests in a settlor's unborn grandchildren).




partnership, the law would treat that partner as though he were in fact a
trustee for the partnership.
3 44
The trust thus became the standard way of consolidating title, and
contemporary observers understood its importance.45 In an 1816
opinion in the New York Court of Chancery, Chancellor Kent explained
why a trust-based joint-stock company had placed its property in the
names of trustees: "The trustees were selected in this case to hold and
represent the property, for the sake of convenience, and because the
subscribers were too numerous to hold and manage the property as a
copartnership." 
3 46
In addition to eliminating the need to rearrange title to a business's
property, the trust also eliminated the need to reorganize the business.
Under the default rules of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century partner-
ship law, a partnership automatically dissolved any time a partner sold his
shares or otherwise withdrew, for death or any other reason.3 47 Hence, if
one partner sold his shares and the partnership was to continue
operating, the default rules of partnership law would have required the
business to dissolve and reorganize again with the purchaser admitted as
a new partner3 48 This problem was very easily solved, however. Trust law
had always allowed a trust to persist after the death, disappearance, or
change of a beneficiary, and a trust instrument did not even need to
expressly declare its persistence after a transfer of the shares to continue
existing.3 49 Partnership law was similarly flexible to the extent that it
applied. The rules of partnership law preventing transfer were mere
344. E.g., Collyer, supra note 188, at 101 ("If a partner takes a lease of lands in his own
name for the purposes of the partnership, he will be considered in equity as trustee.");
Gow, supra note 191, at 47-48 (noting that courts of equity considered there to be "a
tenancy in common between partners of real property, and ... the person in whom the
legal estate vests to be a trustee for those beneficially interested"); 1 Nathaniel Lindley, A
Treatise on the Law of Partnership 323-24 (Bos., Charles H. Edson & Co. 5th ed.
1888) (1860).
345. Bisset, supra note 192, at 47-48 (citing Morris v. Barrett (1829) 148 Eng. Rep.
1228 (Ex); 3 Y & J. 384, for the proposition that "[t]he usual course in conveying real
estate purchased by a partnership is to vest it in a trustee").
346. Van Vechten v. Terry, 2 Johns. Ch. 197, 197 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). Chancellor Kent
reached a similar result on similar grounds a year earlier in a case in which a guardian was
sued for breach of trust. Wiser v. Blachly, 1 Johns. Ch. 437, 437 (N.Y. Ch. 1815).
347. See Dixon, supra note 337, at 167-68 ("Where the partnership is for a term of
years [a right to transfer shares] is of course substantial and valuable; for the continuing
partner cannot dissolve the partnership ...."); 1 Lindley, supra note 344, at 194-95
(implying that a partnership can exist for a term); Story, Commentaries on the Law of
Partnership, supra note 192, § 275 ("Whenever a stipulation is positively made, that the
partnership shall endure for a fixed period, or for a particular adventure or voyage, it
would seem to be at once inequitable and injurious to permit any partner, at his mere
pleasure, to violate his engagement .. ").
348. Harris, Industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 141-43 (describing the need
for partnerships to reorganize as partners withdrew).
349. This was apparently implicit in the Keystone Manufacturing Company, for
example. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 148, at 193-99.
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defaults, not mandates, and they could easily be changed by agreement
among the partners.
We know the trust was effective at enabling tradable shares because
the evidence of share trading is written into the Bubble Act. Recall that
the Bubble Act was passed in 1720 to regulate business trustsY °0 The
center of the Bubble Act was a provision prohibiting a trust from
"pretending to raise transferrable Stock or Stocks."3' 1 The presence of
this language indicates that the trust had, in fact, been effective at
allowing "transferrable Stock or Stocks" in unincorporated companies.
And to be clear, the Bubble Act did not meaningfully change this. As
noted above,3 52 the Bubble Act was rarely enforced, and shares in
unincorporatedjoint-stock companies continued to trade, especially after
the turn of the nineteenth century.
3 53
E. Fiduciary Powers
Business trusts also developed a sensible scheme of fiduciary powers.
The issue arises because, as Professor John Langbein explains, before the
twentieth century, trust law disabled trustees from exercising many
powers.3 54 By default, trustees had almost no powers unless a settlor
expressly granted them.3 55 Trust law also imposed by default a set of
heavy restrictions on investment and property ownership.3Y 6 One such
restriction was that trustees could invest only in land and government




Another was that trustees could not buy and sell trust property without
specific authorization.38 Trust law grew into this mold because it was
consistent with what donative trustees-as distinct from business
trustees-had traditionally done. From late medieval times to the early
twentieth century, a donative trustee's main job was simply to hold a
family estate and pass it to the next generation, and the disabling
framework of fiduciary powers prevented a trustee from disobeying a
350. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80 (discussing the origins of the Bubble
Act of 1720).
351. 6 Geo. 1 c. 18, § 18 (1720) (Eng.).
352. Supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Bubble Act's
ineffectiveness in slowing or stopping the creation of trusts and unincorporated
companies).
353. DuBois, supra note 23; Freeman et al., supra note 24.
354. Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 200, at 640-42.
355. Michael R. Chesterman, Family Settlements on Trust: Landowners and the Rising
Bourgeoisie, in Law, Economy and Society, 1750-1914: Essays in the History of English Law






family's wishes by doing anything more. 9 Modern historians have
argued, though, that this disabling fiduciary framework was inappro-
priate to businesses because it must have hobbled any trustee who tried
to carry out the complicated activities required to operate a business.
3 60
As a practical matter, however, these rules had almost no impact on
nineteenth-century business companies because the rules were defaults,
not mandates. A company could easily change a rule by drafting its deed
of settlement accordingly. This was true for donative trusts, whose
drafters widely opted out of the default restrictions in the nineteenth
century.3 61 And it was also true for business trusts, which often opted out
of the restrictions on investing, for example, by simply endowing their
trustees with nonstandard forms of property, such as machines and
private-company securities. Businesses also opted out of the default rules
about discretionary decisionmaking by instructing their trustees to follow
the directions of boards of directors.3 62 In any case, there is very little
evidence that trustee-powers law meaningfully restricted the activities of
unincorporated joint-stock company trustees. Furthermore, the popu-
larity of the trust in business companies provides circumstantial evidence
that the problem simply could not have been insurmountable. Given that
the trust was enormously widespread in the organization of businesses up
through the early twentieth century, it is simply not plausible to think
that trustees were incapable of operating a business.
CONCLUSION
Throughout modern history, the common law trust offered English
and American businesses a remarkably powerful-and remarkably
modern-form of legal organization. The trust offered almost all of the
same doctrinal features as contemporaneous versions of the corporate
form, and it did so in a package that was freely available to every English
subject and American citizen. The most fragile doctrinal feature of the
359. Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 200, at 640-64; see also John H.
Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114
Yale L.J. 929, 947 (2005); John H. Langbein, The Rise of the Management Trust, 143 Tr. &
Est. 52, 53 (2004).
360. Harris, Industrializing English Law, supra note 16, at 147-59.
361. Chesterman, supra note 355, at 162-63. Contemporary treatises also made it clear
that fiduciary duties about some types of investments could easily be waived. The Sanders
treatise, for example, said in 1824 that "[a] trustee cannot... alter the nature of the trust
property"-unless, of course, the trustee had received "an express power for that
purpose." 1 Sanders, supra note 149, at 364-65. The first edition of Thomas Lewin's
treatise took a similar view. Thomas Lewin, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts and
Trustees 311 (London, A. Maxwell 1837) ("in the absence, then, of any express power, the
only unobjectionable investment is in one of the Government or Bank Annuities.").
362. For examples of companies that did this, see Vigers v. Pike (1842) 8 Eng. Rep.
220 (HL) 220; 8 Cl. & F 562; Lund v. Blanshard (1844) 67 Eng. Rep. 540 (Ch) 541-44; 4
Hare 9; Rv. Cain (1841) 169 Eng. Rep. 81 (Ch) 81; 2 Mod. 204.
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trust was limited liability. But even limited liability was almost as strong in
the trust as in contemporaneous versions of the corporate form. Thus,
although the trust was never a completely perfect substitute for the
corporate form, the trust frequently came close enough to be a serious
competitor of the corporate form from early modern times until nearly a
hundred years after the corporate form became widely available.
This thesis is important because it calls into question the central
narrative of business law history. For decades, legal scholars have devoted
themselves to understanding precisely when the corporate form
appeared and exactly who had access to it. The need for such an
understanding has been driven by the sense that there was something
deeply special about the corporate form-that the corporate form was
the only form of organization that could offer the legal technologies that
made modern business possible. The rise of the corporate form has
almost been equated with the rise of big business itself.
The trust thus invites us to reappraise the corporate form and its
historical functions. If the corporate form did not offer a unique set of
doctrinal features, then what exactly did it do? Why did businesses want
incorporation, and why did the government ry to limit their access to it?
These are deep questions with far-reaching implications. And the history
of the trust suggests that we need a new set of answers.
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